NAVY

Approved For I

Declassification/Rel

ease Instructions

on File

Approved For Release 2001/11/1783 LCTALRIDE 80 B0 1654 F0 U3 800 256001-1

5-6 APRIL 1974

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY; NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION SEMINAR, THE PATTERSON SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE

THE PATTERSON SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE The University of Kentucky --- Lexington, Kentucky 40506

in cooperation with

The National Strategy Information Center, Inc., New York and
New York University Graduate Program in National Security

PARTICIPANTS -- NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION SEMINAR

Professor Bernhard Abrahamsson Graduate School of International Studies -- Cherrington Hall University of Denver Denver, Colorado 80210

Professor Damian A. Barthle Department of History Jefferson Community College Louisville, Kentucky 40201

Professor Clyde T. Bates Georgetown College Georgetown, Kentucky 40324

Professor William Bowker Department of Government Centre College Danville, Kentucky 40422

Colonel Charles Brindel, USA Director Army ROTC Program University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor John K. Brown Hazard Community College Hazard, Kentucky 41701

Professor Robert L. Burke Department of History Murray State University Murray, Kentucky 42071 Dr. Morris K. Caudill Dean of Undergraduate Programs Morehead State University Morehead, Kentucky 40351

Lieutenant James T. Chapman, USN Naval ROTC Program Instructor University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

Lt. Commander David G. Clark, USN Aide to the President U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Captain James P. Connell, USA Army ROTC Program Instructor University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

Professor Vincent Davis
Director and Patterson Chair
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Dudley E. DeGroot
Department of Anthropology
Eckerd College
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

NSES PARTICIPANTS

Professor Maurice A. East
Associate Director [also faculty
Department of Political Science]
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Gene J. Garfield Department of Political Science Murray State University Murray, Kentucky 42071

Professor Curtis Harvey Department of Economics University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Roy O. Hatton Department of History Murray State University Murray, Kentucky 42071

Professor George Herring Department of History University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Charles W. Johnson Department of History University of Tennessee Knoxville, Tennessee 37916

Major Russell L. Johnson, USA Army ROTC Program Instructor Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana 47401

Professor Lewis M. Kirk, Jr.
Department of History and
Political Science
Kentucky State University
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

Professor John Kleber Department of History Morehead State University Morehead, Kentucky 40351

Professor Caroline Krebs
Department of Political Science
Bellarmine College
2000 Norris Place
Louisville, Kentucky 40205

Professor Philip G. Laemmle Department of Political Science University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

Major Paul Lewis, Jr., USA Graduate Student Department of Political Science Atlanta University Residence: 601-A Miller Drive Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330

Colonel William A. Lusby, USAF Director Air Force ROTC Program University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45221

Professor Robert F. Maddox Department of History Marshall University Huntington, West Virginia 25701

Professor Robert D. McAninch Department of Political Science Prestonsburg Community College Prestonsburg, Kentucky 41653

Professor Kevin G. McCullen Department of Political Science Union College Barbourville, Kentucky 40906

NSES PARTICIPANTS

Professor Charles Moskos
Department of Sociology
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois 60201
[on leave for the 1973-74 year
at University of Texas (Austin)]

Mr. George Muns
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Glen Murrell Division of Social Sciences Paducah Community College Post Office Box 1380 Paducah, Kentucky 42001

Professor Paul David Nelson Department of Political Science Berea College Berea, Kentucky 40403

Professor Dennis J. O'Keefe Department of Political Science Northern Kentucky State College Highland Heights, Kentucky 41076

Captain Glenn C. Peck, USAF Air Force ROTC Program Instructor University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor John H. Petersen Department of Government Western Kentucky University Bowling Green, Kentucky 42102

Professor Robert L. Peterson Department of Political Science University of Tennessee Knoxville, Tennessee 37916 Mr. Philip A. Reemes
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Ms. Dianne Reif
Assistant to the Director
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Abdul H. Rifai Department of Political Science Berea College Berea, Kentucky 40403

Professor Chun W. Ro Department of Political Science Paducah Community College Post Office Box 1380 Paducah, Kentucky 42001

Professor Carl G. Ryant Department of History University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

Professor Andrew K. Semmel Department of Political Science University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

Professor Sheldon Simon Department of Political Science University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Captain M. E. Smith, USN Director Naval ROTC Program University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

NSES PARTICIPANTS

Professor Fred A. Sondermann Department of Political Science The Colorado College Colorado Springs, Colorado 80903

Professor Troy M. Stewart, Jr. Department of Political Science Marshall University
Huntington, West Virginia 25701

Professor Jack W. Thacker, Jr. Department of History Western Kentucky University Bowling Green, Kentucky 42101

Professor Robert Toohey Elizabethtown Community College Elizabethtown, Kentucky 42701

Lt. Commander Robert Trammell, USNR Commanding Officer
Naval Reserve Training Center
Springhill Drive
Lexington, Kentucky 40503

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN President U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840 Wiss-NH OMB 26 Jon Sound 1900 8.1 1903 Den Stoff 190- Freminn Jas Z Eur do more 4 selves Define not int/24it the lead 2 use-Colongation

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02840

PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE FOR 3 - 6 APRIL 1974

Wednesday, 3 April

(Service Dress Blue)

0600 - Depart by President's car for T.F. Green

0700 - Allegheny Flight 486

0810 - Arrive National Airport - Met by CNO car

0845 - Call on RADM Grojean

0900 - Call on CNO

0915 - Call on SecNav

0945 - CNO car to Arlington Annex

1000 - Call on RADM Bill Read

1050 - CNO car to National Airport

1115 - United Flight 277

1209 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1340 - Continental Flight 17

1555 - Arrive Colorado Springs - Met by USAFA representative

1800 - Informal buffet

2000 - Address to Cadet Defense Policy classes

RON BOQ

Thursday, 4 April

0700-0800 Breakfast

0830 - Conference convenes

(Lunch with Cadet Wing)

1830 - Cocktails

1930 - Dinner followed by Address

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

Friday, 5 April

0645 - Breakfast

0730 - USAFA car to Airport

0800 - Continental Flight 20

1157 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1305 - American Flight 283

1501 - Arrive Cincinnati. Met by NRTC car (LCDR TRAMMEL)

1600 (1 hr) - Arrive The Springs Motel, 2020 Harrodsburg Road, Lexington, Kentucky

1745 - Drive to University of Kentucky Faculty-Alumni Club, Spindletop Hall, Ironworks Pike

1815 - Refreshments in Rathskeller

1900 - Dinner

2000 - 2200 Session #3 "The Military and American Society": Moskos

RON at The Springs

Saturday, 6 April

0700 - Breakfast at The Springs with local Naval Reservists

0830 - Session #4 - "Issues and Challenges with the U.S. Military: An Insider's Perspectives" - VADM Turner

Roundtable chaired by COL Brindel, Director, Army ROTC, University of Kentucky

1000 - Break

1015 - Session #5 - "Trends in U.S. Defense Policy" - Vince Davis

1230 - Depart for Cincinnati by NRTC car

1524 – Allegheny Flight 818

1755 - Arrive Logan/Boston. Met by President's car

1930 - Arrive NavWarCol

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

PEOPLE

WASHINGTON	Room #	Telephone #
RADM Grojean	4E572	OX-52453
CNO	4E660	OX-56007
Chief Carpenter	4E658	OX-54412
SecNav	4E710	OX-53131
	Pers_2711 76 K St. NW	OX-41291 833-8400)
<u>USAFA:</u> Conference		AVN 259-2270
BOQ	Suite	259-3127
MAJ Doug Murray	Ноте	259-1389
KENTUCKY The Patters on School	•	(606) 257-4666/7
The Springs Motel (Qtrs)		277-5751
Spindletop Hall (Friday)	·.	<i>252-3488</i>
Trustees Lounge & Board	l Room (Sat)	258-8233
Mrs. William Drews - 175 E Chicag		803 (312) 664-5342
Mr. Richard D. Harza - 150	South Wacker Drive, Ch	icago- Office: (312)- 855- 7000 Home:
Mr. C. Keith Shay - 445 Ced	ar St., Winnetka	(312)-446-7280 (312)-236-4500
Mr. LeRoy F. Nichalson 1	18 Lindenwood Drive, Littleton, Colorado	(303) 798-5718
Mr. Brady Black - Cincinno Approvided For Releas #2001/151/2		<i>(513) 721-2700</i> 0 0230001-1

INDEX OF TABS

ITEM	TAB
Letters to and from USAFA	A
Speech Cards	В
Some Reflections on the War Colleges by Col. John B. Keeley, USA	С
Why A War College	D
Missions of the U.S. Navy	E
1973 Annual Report	\mathbf{F}
Kentucky	
Official Highway Map	М
Letters to and from Vince Davis	N
Speech Cards	0

A

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80840

ATTN OF: DFPSI

26 November 1973

SUBJECT:

Third Annual Interservice Defense Policy Conference (Your Ltr, 15 Nov 1973)

TO:

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner President Naval War College

Naval War College Newport, R. I. 02840

Dear Admiral Turner

I am-pleased to learn that you can join us for the Third Annual Interservice Defense Policy Conference. Your banquet address suggestion is first-rate. Advanced education in the military is a vital topic, and I am certain the conferees will find your remarks particularly interesting.

As we get closer to the conference dates we will be writing to you about travel plans and arranging with you the itinerary for your Academy visit. Perhaps you will remember our mentioning briefly in Chicago the possibility of addressing our cadets during your visit here. When I suggested this to the officers in the department, there was such an enthusiastic response that I am making bold to impose on your kindness to consider such a presentation. Depending on the travel schedule you may be able to work out, we could arrange either an evening lecture or a late afternoon session through the Cadet Forum sometime during the 3-5 April period. I know that cadets as well as many of our faculty officers would appreciate and benefit from hearing some of your thoughts on the appropriate education for future military leaders or more specifically on the senior service schools.


I also appreciate receiving your participant nominations. I have added these names to our preliminary list, and I will extend invitations to each of these officers within the next few days. As you know, we strive to balance the attendees among each of the military services. Your suggestions will assist us greatly in achieving equal representation.

Thank you again for accepting our invitation. We look forward to having you visit the Air Force Academy and participate in our conference.

Sincerely

Malham M. Wakin MALHAM M. WAKIN, Colonel, USAF

Professor and Head



PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island 02840

\$5 NOV 1973

Dear Colonel Wakin,

I'm indeed looking forward to taking part in your 3-5 April Conference and would be honored to present an address on the 4th. In line with your themes and in light of my current position, I would prefer to speak on the role of advanced education in the military. I feel it's time for some innovative moves in education over a man's career if we are to thrive in this era of the AVF. We must look at education as a continuing process and not attempt merely to inject spurts of knowledge in large doses.

I found your delegate invitation list intriguing. Not only is the Navy the only delegation with female members, but 50% of its delegate membership are women. You also show a Colonel John B. Heeley, U.S. Army--I hope this is, in fact, Colonel John B. Keeley who is a mainstay in my Strategy Department at NWC.

As for additional nominations, I recommend:

Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Murray, USMC Staff Judge Advocate 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, MWHS-1 FPO San Francisco, CA 96602

A 1973 graduate of NWC who holds a doctorate, is a member of the bar, and has done extensive research into the Code of Conduct.

> Lieutenant Commander Peter H. Cressy, USN U.S. Naval War College Naval Base Newport, RI 02840

Pete is doing advanced research here in the area of interpersonal relationships and leadership.

Lieutenant Commander Jerry M. Blesch, USN Executive Officer USS VOGE (DE-1047) FPO New York, NY 09501

Jerry is a 1962 graduate, spent several years on the road as special assistant to our Chief of Naval Personnel and currently is second in command of a destroyer escort in Florida.

Lieutenant Commander William C. Miller, USN Commanding Officer
USS McCLOY (DE-1038)
FPO New York, NY 09501

Bill is a 1962 U.S. Naval Academy graduate and Burke Scholar who holds a doctorate, spent two years working in the strategic area with the CNO's staff, and is now Commanding Officer of a destroyer.

Commander Edward B. Baker, USN Office of Secretary of Defense Navy Department Washington, DC 20350

Ted, by coincidence works next to Colonel Bill Albright on your list. Ted is a 1959 U.S. Naval Academy graduate and Burke Scholar who has commanded a destroyer, spent many years in OPNAV and OSD/SA, as well as being a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

I would also recommend:

Commander Ronald J. Zlatoper, USN Naval Administration Unit Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139

and

Commander Lawrence T. Wright, USN
Department of the Navy
Naval Intelligence Command (NIC-03C)
2461 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22331

These two men were at the top of our Command and Staff course here last year. They are both extremely bright and forward thinking individuals.

Warmest regards and I'm looking forward to April

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Colonel Malham M. Wakin, U.S. Air Force Department of Political Science and Philosophy U.S. Air Force Academy Colorado Springs, CO 80840

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80840

REPLY TO ATTN OF:

DFPSP

2 November 1973

SUBJECT:

Third Annual Interservice Defense Policy Conference

vice Admiral Stansfield Turner
Commandant
Naval War College

Navai war College Newport RI 02840

Dear Admiral Turner

As I discussed with you in Chicago, the Department of Political Science and Philosophy will host the Third Annual Interservice Defense Policy Conference over the period 3-5 April 1974. I take this opportunity to invite you to attend the conference and to address the participants at a banquet planned for the evening of 4 April 1974.

The conference will bring together a select group of about forty military company and field grade officers to discuss issues which vitally concern the Armed Forces. We have selected "Innovation in the Military" for the theme, and we propose to examine the topics indicated on the attached agenda (Attachment 1).

You could speak on any of the topics suggested or any other subject you feel would interest the conferees. Since those officers presently serve in or shortly will serve in sensitive staff or command positions, your experiences could provide meaningful guidance to them in effecting change.

In addition to the proposed topical agenda, I inclose a Conference Schedule (Attachment 2) and a tentative list of this year's participants (Attachment 3). I would appreciate any nominations you might suggest for Navy attendees.

If you can accept our invitation, we would gladly arrange your transportation to the Academy and accommodations for your stay.

Sincerely

Malham M. Wakin, Colonel, USAF

Professor and Head

3 Atch

- 1. Topical Agenda
- 2. Conference Schedule
- 3. Delegate Invitation List

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

THIRD INTERSERVICE DEFENSE POLICY CONFERENCE

Topical Agenda

THEME: Innovation in the Military: The Challenge in a Changing Society

Plenary Session One - 3 April 1974 - Morning

ISSUE AREA 1: The Concept of Professionalism--A Foundation for Innovation

TOPICS

- 1. The Nature of the Profession--the Attitudinal Dimension (Fusionist vs Separatist, etc.)
- 2. Integrity
- 3. Careerist Syndrome
- 4. Utility of a Social Science/Humanities Background
- 5. Utility of a Physical Science/Engineering Background
- 6. Public image of the profession and steps to inform the public of the nature of the profession

Plenary Session Two - 3 April 1974 - Afternoon

ISSUE AREA 2: Innovation in the Management of National Security
TOPICS

1. Strategic Thought

- a. Deterrence
- b. Radical transformation of the alliance structures
- c. Domestic constraints
- d. Effects of the energy crisis
- e. Military role and place in the doctrine of realistic deterrence

2. Weapons Acquisition

- a. Question of priorities: military vs non-military
- b. Capability diffusion (providing allies and others with weapons systems)
- c. Effects of and on the balance of payments
- d. Threats to bureaucratic essence
- e. Budgetary constraints on acquisition
- f. Quantity vs quality

Atch 1

Topical Agenda (continued)

Plenary Session Three - 4 April 1974 - Morning

ISSUE AREA 3: Innovation in Personnel Management

TOPICS

- 1. Problem of the Specialist vs the Generalist in the:
 - a. Composition of the armed forces
 - b. Education of the armed forces
- 2. Incentive Programs (promotion system)
- 3. Length of Tours
- 4. Evaluation Procedures (OER, etc.)
- 5. Recruitment Programs the Minorities
- 6. Benefit Crises (Hospitalization, Retirement, etc.)

Plenary Session Four - 4 April 1974 - Afternoon

ISSUE AREA 4: Costs of Innovation

TOPICS

- 1. Service Parochialism
- 2. Bureaucratic Momentum and Enertia
- 3. The Loyal Innovator
- 4. Generation Gap
- 5. High Cost of Innovation Failures

THIRD INTERSERVICE DEFENSE POLICY CONFERENCE

Conference Schedule

2 April 1974 - TUESDAY

Arrive and check in

Dinner at Academy Officers Club

3 April 1974 - WEDNESDAY

Breakfast available at Academy Officers Club

Plenary Session 1

Lunch at Academy Officers Club

Plenary Session 2

Dinner (informal) at Colonel Wakin's home

4 April 1974 - THURSDAY

Breakfast available at Academy Officers Club

Plenary Session 3

Lunch with the Cadet Wing

Plenary Session 4



5 April 1974 - FRIDAY

Breakfast available at Academy Officers Club

Session 5 - committees

Lunch at Academy Officers Club

Plenary Session 6 - Open-ended discussion

Open evening

DELEGATE INVITATION LIST

Air Force

Colonel William E. Albright

Major Robert H. Baxter

Major George L. Butler

Colonel Jack T. Chain, Jr.

Colonel Von R. Christenson

Colonel Robert E. Kelley

Colonel Robert W. Kennedy

Major Richard L. Klass

$\underline{\text{Army}}$

Lt Colonel Zeb B. Bradford

Major Larry D. Budge

Captain Dan Christman

Captain Huba Wass de Czege

Lt Colonel Peter M. Dawkins

Lt Colonel Charles W. Dyke

Major James Ellis

Lt Colonel Robert M. Elton

Colonel John B. Heeley

Captain Jack H. Jacobs

Lt Colonel Stanley Kanarowski

Colonel Bob Leider

Colonel Louis G. Michael, Jr.

Army (continued)

Lt Colonel Paul L. Miles, Jr.

Lt Colonel John Modlering

Lt Colonel John G. Pappageorge

Major Stanley W. Russell

Lt Colonel Donald P. Shaw

Lt Colonel Herb Sullivan

Lt Colonel Jack Walker

Marine Corps

Lt Colonel Marian G. Busby

Major John M. Dye

Navy

Commander James J. Clarkin

Lcdr (Beth)F. Coye

Lcdr Lee Gunn

Lcdr Roberta L. Hazard

Commander Richard C. Knott

Cdr Ronald Pitkin

Lcdr(Sarah)J. Watlington

Lcdr (Elizabeth G. Wylie

15 February, 1974

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR COLLEGES

Col. John B. Keeley, USA

The institutions of highest education in the military, the War Colleges, recently have come under increasing scrutiny from within and without the military services. Congress and a small element of the university world have questioned the utility and costs of the War Colleges. Several of the War Colleges are now undergoing an evaluation of their curricula to insure that focus and content are appropriate to the challenges facing the military today. The Army and Navy War Colleges have within the past two years made major changes in their curricula to this end. This scrutiny and these changes are desirable and necessary. Change is inherent in the educational process. It is especially important in the military professional schools as the United States leaves Viet Nam and the "cold war" and moves into a new world.

To avoid change for change's sake, it is necessary for the War Colleges to have a clear understanding of their functions. This essay offers some reflections on this matter. To provide a framework for discussion, three questions will be broadly considered. Why educate the military? Who should be educated? What should be taught?

Why Educate the Military?

The answer to this question is in many parts. Some answers come quickly to mind; the complexity of managing an extensive, expensive, technology-based organization requires periodic updating on what is new in the "business." The reflection associated with a period of education

allows the redefinition of professional goals and the development of new initiatives for the solution of old problems. These are two of the principal reasons justifying advanced education for business executives. They also support education of military executives.

But the most important reasons for educating senior officers stem from two salient characteristics of the military profession. First, the profession spends most of its time not doing what it is ultimately organized and intended to do which is to fight and win wars.* The point here is that the educational needs of an organization which spends most of its time not doing what it was organized and intended to do must be quite unique. The implications of this "uniqueness" must be identified and examined by the War Colleges. Second, the profession has a strong and most important ethical content. The ethical issues involve ultimately the life and death of the nation and its citizens. For this reason the ethical issues of the military profession are profoundly different from those of other professions. There is a tendency for the values, the ethics, of the military profession to be taken for granted. This must not happen. The military must continually refresh and invigorate its values. These values must be tested and reconfirmed in a society which has changing and often antagonistic values. The War Colleges have a vital task here.

Before the unique aspects of the military profession and its values are studied, it is necessary to establish a conception of the role of

^{*}In the 29 years since 1945, Korea and Viet Nam have involved approximately 11 years of active fighting. Approximately 72% of the US military's time since 1945 has not been in combat.

force and policy in the achievement of national ends. It is necessary to examine the purposes for which force is employed both in peace and war. The implications of Clausewitz's dictum "from which war is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means" are far more complex than either military or civilian leaders appreciate. The military are the handmaidens of policy in peace as well as war. How the military defines its relation to the policy process is vital to the profession and to society. It is under this rubric that the functions, the unique characteristics and the values of the profession can be studied as an integrated whole. Through this approach the War Colleges establish their legitimacy as the apex of military education.

The War Colleges cannot teach everything. They should teach the profession. To the extent that the military need specialists in management, international relations, psychology and the like, they should be trained at civilian educational institutions. War Colleges should educate their students in the most demanding and complex of all professions—the military profession in a democratic society.

The phenomena of war and the military profession as objects of research and special concern are sadly neglected children in today's time. The American intellectual community has at best a thinly veiled distaste for the subject. Sadly, the American military, which has a long history of winning wars with organizations, weapons and strategies derived from other countries, also has the pragmatist's dislike of philosophical speculation.* Further, it is also almost inevitable that, during periods

^{*}How many officers, colonel and above, have read, let alone studied, On War?

of peace, successful "management" becomes the sine qua non for professional advancement. Management becomes a surrogate for war fighting.

In order that the American military can best respond to its future responsibilities it must fully understand its role and functions in peace and war. The War Colleges can perform this function. American society should insist that they do so.

What has been emphasized here is not intended to exclude the conventional academic disciplines from the War College curriculum or to establish a "cult" of the military. Disciplines such as history, economics, public and business administration, sociology and international relations have real value when taught in the context of what has been described above. In fact, their value to the profession is directly dependent upon the context in which they are taught.

Who Should Be Educated?

Remembering that we are dealing at the highest level of military education, selection for this education should probably be restricted to the top 10% of the officers of the grades of colonel/captain and lieutenant colonel/commander. It is probable that future policymakers and future advisors to policymakers will come from this group. This would be a fairly large number, for to restrict it to a smaller, more carefully selected group would likely leave a significant number of officers destined for higher places as "uneducated." Further, the selection of only a small number has the real danger of generating a self-perpetuating group of military elitists within the services. The military cannot afford intellectual elitism because in time elitism

becomes conservatism and resistance to change. In this selection it is important that there be a representative cross-section of all major functional elements within the services and also from the senior civilian employees within the Department of Defense. The first value of having a disparate group educated together is the effect of having men of mixed experiences, prejudices and perceptions all addressing the same issues. The enrichment is remarkable. A second value is that, if indeed the top 10% have been selected, these people will meet each other with increasing frequency as they move towards positions of greater responsibility. The respect, understanding and friendships established at a War College do much to facilitate the operation of the massive military bureaucracies.

What Should Be Taught?

The curriculum of a War College as a professional institution should focus on the nature of the military profession and the three broad functional responsibilities of the profession. Once these responsibilities have been established the supportive disciplines will be taught to illuminate the complexities that the profession faces today. Let me define these and then briefly outline a curriculum that would support these responsibilities.

As suggested before, every War College has the obligation to define the nature of the military profession to its students. This is so because the large majority of the officers attending a War College can be characterized as having little understanding of the nature and history of the military profession. They are, indeed, skilled aviators, intelligence

specialists, infantrymen, submariners and so forth. A useful analogy is to consider them as master craftsmen who know relatively little of the architectural principles which govern the work that they do. To meet their increasing responsibilities, it is necessary to lift their horizons to the level of the architects of military policy.

The historical processes which transformed the warrior class into a profession need to be explored. The internal values of loyalty, integrity, discipline and obedience need to be discussed. The clash between these values and those of a liberal society must be examined. The compatibility of military organizational principles and modern management techniques should be considered. These issues should be raised not with intent of resolving them but for the purpose of identifying them as current and continuing problems for the military profession and for society at large.

It is in this portion of the study that the three inherent functions of any military organization should be identified. To refresh those who may have forgotten:

The first responsibility of the military profession is to organize, train, equip, maintain and employ forces as directed. In peacetime this is largely a management function. The object of this function is to maintain the highest level of combat readiness possible with the resources available. It occupies most of the time and resources of most of the Armed Forces. It is the area of professional responsibility that most officers understand best and to which they devote most of their concern. The study of resource allocation, economics and organizational psychology would be keyed to this responsibility.

The second responsibility is to provide military advice to national political leaders. This proposition, as stated, is probably agreeable to most thoughtful military and civilians. The interpretation of what is "proper or appropriate" military advice is a subtle and complex problem. This issue can be stated in the form of two questions: What are the limits of military power in the support of policy? What are the obligations of policy to military power once military power is engaged in combat? There are no simple answers to these questions. Yet these questions must be addressed and addressed again if the military is to understand its proper role in our society. The complex, almost undefinable process which selects and elects national political leaders generally prepares them well for dealing with domestic issues. It seldom provides any real preparation for the awesomely difficult task of directing the armed forces of the United States. As is evident by the institutional changes of the Department of Defense and the Executive Staff of the White House which have occurred over the past 20 years, there is a recognized need for increased civilian control of the processes of formulating and implementing national security policy. There are several implications to the increased civilianization of the national security organizations. The implication of most importance here is the inevitable role confusion which has occurred at the highest levels of policy formulation.

This role confusion is reflected not only in the fact of senior civilians within the Defense Department planning air strikes and determining weapons systems characteristics but also in the military's own concept of the soldier-statesman. This hermaphrodite role raises serious questions

about the civilian control of the military. The controversy over

General Haig's position in the White House is only the latest example.

What issues are properly the primary concern of the military? What is the proper role of the professional military in policy formulation? As has been suggested above, it is not likely that a President or his civilian staff assistants will have the background to be especially well qualified to deal with these questions except in broad generalities. For this reason, it is doubly important for the military to have a firm conception of its role in the policy process. This role is always subject to interpretation and modification by the President, but at least a clear understanding of the nature of its role by the military provides a point of departure for establishing effective civilian control. Some in our society would resist the idea that the military profession has the right and obligation to define its role; yet, if the military fails to do so, it is possible that the question will either go begging or, more likely, be resolved through the increased civilianization of the armed forces.* Both will result in the erosion of the military as a profession and weaken the character of the armed forces with serious consequences in time of conflict. I have deliberately belabored this point because it is the responsibility most difficult to carry out and most subject to catastrophic consequences when not properly executed. The study of historical case studies will best address this area of concern.

^{*} For a discussion of some of the implications of civilianization of the Armed Forces see Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment, Chapter 6, "The Civilianized Military Command."

The third responsibility is to define the future. Simply stated. Most difficult to do. That this is difficult may account to some degree why the military have been so partial, traditionally, to preparing for the last war. The lead time for change in the military is very long. Longer today than it has ever been. It takes years to develop and produce not only hardware but also to make significant changes to organization and training. Near term conflicts will always be fought with resources and doctrine in being. The process of renewal of the military organization, if it is to be fruitful, requires that the military assess the nature of likely conflicts and likely peacetime roles in the years to come. This problem is particularly acute today. The United States detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic seriously weakens the "cold war" rationale for large military forces. The fraying NATO scenario also weakens the rationale for the kinds of military force that the United States presently has. Increasing costs are likely to price conventional force structures out of existence. This portion of the course would serve as the capstone of the year. It would integrate the previous studies.

A curriculum so designed does not prevent a War College from teaching subjects peculiar to the interests of its own service. To the contrary, the special functions and responsibilities of each service can be best highlighted in such a course.

To sum up: the approach discussed in this paper provides a coherent, intellectual framework for organizing a War College curriculum. Concomitantly, it provides a totally defensible raison d'etre for the War Colleges.

Most important, however, is that it provides a context for the student which makes his studies professionally meaningful. For years the War Colleges have been providing the student with pieces of the professional puzzle; now is the time to reveal the cover to the puzzle box.

WHY A WAR COLLEGE

Introduction.

The complex dynamics of power relationships in a nuclear world, coupled with rapidly evolving technology, have profoundly changed the role of the military in society. It is no longer enough that the military professional be prepared to carry out the missions of his service in wartime. Today the military leader must understand and weigh the economic, sociological, and political implications of his decisions. He must be ready to contribute meaningfully to the development of national policy designed to lessen the risk of war. This is a grave responsibility and one for which the Senior Service College plays a major part in preparing him.

Why Mid-Career Military Education?

Since 1884, when the first Senior Service College was established, it has been recognized that an officer reaches a point about mid-career when the nature of his duties begins to change significantly. At about the 0-5 (LCOL/CDR) level, he is called on more and more to make decisions which affect not just his specialty or organization, but his whole Service or the entire Military Establishment. Often these decisions impact on the national budget in major terms. The experiences of his early career years which are largely devoted to perfecting skills in a specialized area of military warfare, do not adequately prepare him for these new responsibilities.

How then does the military officer broaden his perspectives to encompass the frequently uncertain issues of policy? Where does he acquire the skills to deal with these issues rationally and effectively?

While civilian schools of business, recognizing similar needs in middle management, can provide answers in general terms, the professions, such as law, medicine, engineering, and the military, cannot be served adequately in general terms. The unique nature of their skills and the importance of their service to the fabric of society as a whole demand institutions dedicated to dealing with the peculiar problems of the profession, promoting the development of new concepts and ideas, and acting as a repositories

of accumulated professional knowledge. In this respect, the Senior Service Colleges, for the military, meet the special and changing demands of the military profession. Some of these special demands include:

- Reducing parochialism: Cumulative technological progress forces specialization which in turn encourages parochialism. Parochialism, if permitted at the policy-making level, discourages the honest search for the best alternative solutions to any given problem.
- Dealing with uncertainty: Junior military officers must develop the ability to make rapid, accurate decisions in operational situations. However, the answers to broader issues are not always absolute -black or white; they are often somewhere in between. Officers must understand how to deal with uncertainty and how to make the best decision from among imperfect alternatives.
- Encouraging innovative thinking: Organizations, especially large ones, demand a certain amount of conformity by their members. While this is useful at lower levels because it promotes order, it can be harmful at the policy making level. It can inhibit the flexibility every organization needs to adjust to changes. Individuals do not easily break out of established rigid or narrow thinking patterns unless they can be challenged personally and in areas relating directly to their profession.
- Broadening professional knowledge: The military places an extremely wide range of demands on its members, often under difficult conditions: leadership; resource management; technical currency; appreciation of the principles of government, foreign policy, and diplomacy; and capacity to formulate military strategy. Frequently military leaders are required to operate in arenas where they have had no previous direct experience. Seldom can the military officer, unlike other professionals, refresh his knowledge through practice of his profession for he spends most of his time not engaged in his profession's primary function; warfighting.
- Understanding the ethics of the profession: The legal and ethical tenets of the military profession often border on questions of morality. They are at the same time reflective of the national ethic. An appreciation of these principles cannot be left to some vague, haphazard process. The individual military officer needs an opportunity to study questions involving military ethics, discuss them with his peers, and develop a firm ethical basis for future actions.

In summary, there is a need to expand the perspectives and improve the analytical techniques of mid-career military officers who will soon be shaping military policy as well as operations in positions of greater responsibility.

What Should a Senior Service College Teach?

Senior Service Colleges should:

- Identify and study alternative methods of solving problems in three basic areas unique to the military profession:
 - formulation of strategy
 - allocation and management of resources
 - development of tactics to utilize available resources in support of strategy.
- Avoid updates of current affairs or technical data which the student can do as effectively on his own and the usefulness of which perishes quickly over time.
- Deal with fundamental professional issues involving ethics, civil-military relations such as subordination to civilian control and responsibility for providing advice to civilian leaders etc.
- Provide a forum for differing points of view both within and outside of the profession.
- Encourage critical thinking.

Other Roles that the Senior Service College should Play

- The military profession needs an institution to encourage thinking, a place of directed reflection and research. This cannot be found in the high pressure of Washington. The bureaucracy must deal with contemporary problems and within deadlines. An institution must be available to provide an atmosphere for exploration of the frontiers of the profession. It must be based on the principles of intellectual freedom, encourage dissent, and stimulate new ideas which will provide the yeast for continued modernization and development of the profession.
- o There is a need for improved communication among military professionals, civilian defense intellectuals

the bureaucracy and the rest of society. There has been too little communication and interaction among these elements in the past. The military, because of its concern with immediate crisis has ralinquished too much to the "think tanks". It has been too concerned with operational matters. Senior Service Colleges can help develop a collaborative effort between civilians and the military on the broader issues of policy and resultant force planning.

Alternatives to the Senior Service College:

Correspondence Courses:

Many of the basic objectives of a Senior Service College can be accomplished through correspondence courses, but these are best suited to the transmission of factual data. It is difficult to stimulate the student's imagination and promote logical reasoning when the student-teacher dialogue is interrupted by time, space, and operational distractions.

Civilian Educational Institutions:

- The three dimensions of military thought, strategy, management and tactics are interdependent. Strategic studies are vacuous unless they are related to the technological, economic, and tactical means of implementing them. For instance, the study of the allocation and management of resources for military ends is only meaningful when considered in the context of the strategy those resources are assigned to support. Tactical development flows both from strategy and technologically attainable means and in turn can modify strategic thinking and weapons design and procurement. Even if it were possible to treat them separately it is unlikely that any existing non-military institution would suffice for the following reasons:
- Civilian institutions offer graduate courses in contemporary international relations, political science and history individually and for the primary purpose of training future college professors and scholars. The strategic decision maker must understand their interrelationship and gain experience in applying their principles to contemporary situations.
- Civilian courses in resource allocation are not specifically applicable to the DoD arena where quantifiable objectives such as profit and rate of return on investment are less precise and where non-quantifiable factors such as Congressional influence are unique.

- In the study of the tactical employment of resources, there are no universities currently teaching naval tactics and it is questionable whether they could undertake the task in view of the classified nature of much of the course materials.
- Other military education and training institutions:
 Portions of a War College curriculum could be sandwiched in
 other education or training programs. However, most of
 these concentrate on the transmission of factual data.
 It would require a reorientation of their curricula and
 teaching techniques and would likely confuse the student
 as to primary educational goals.

Who Should Attend a Senior Service College:

Not all mid-career level officers need attend a Senior Service College. Many should remain in their technical areas. Those involved in technical engineering specialities or research probably will not move to positions of broad managerial responsibility and would not need a senior service college education. However, it is difficult to draw a precise line as to who should attend. Opportunity should not be limited to just those officers who are certain candidates for flag or general rank. This would be too restrictive because they are not the only officers providing substantial input and direction to important decisions and policies. All officers should attend a senior service college who could benefit from the experience and who can be identified as needing it for future service productivity.

Summary:

Senior Service Colleges exist because of the immense responsibilities that rest on the shoulders of military leaders. For close to a century mid-career education has helped officers make the transition from the specialized and technical duties of junior rank to the broad managerial and operational responsibilities of more senior grades. There are no indicators that there is lessening applicability of this educational need today. In fact, the opposite is true. At the same time, there is no suitable substitute educational opportunity tailored to developing habits of thought and reasoning in the context of military strategy, resource allocation, and tactics.

MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY

by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner

SEA CONTROL STUDY

SELECTED READINGS IN TACTICS

MISSIONS PAPER


FOREWORD

In 1970, with an end to nearly a decade of Vietnam conflict in sight, a new Chief of Naval Operations determined that the first undertaking in planning the future U.S. Navy must be a searching reassessment of the Navy's role and raison d'etre. This introspective inquiry led to the definition of four "Naval mission areas"--Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence.

There is nothing new or unique about statements of purpose for the Navy. What is both new and unique about the present set of mission statements is that they are being used explicitly in formulating naval strategic plans, and allocating resources during the annual budget process.

Naval Tactics can best be viewed in the light of these four mission areas because tactics are obviously constrained by the strategic choices and resource allocations derived from the Service's missions. Accordingly, this paper attempts to set the Naval Tactics course in perspective by discussing the following aspects of naval missions:

- I. Utility.
- II. Evolution.
- III. Definition.
 - IV. Issues.



I. USEFULNESS OF CATEGORIZING NAVY MISSIONS

Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accustomed to phrases such as "sea power," "command of the seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms, "Strategic Deterrence," "Sea Control," "Presence" may seem to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been a re-definition of traditional U.S. Naval roles and missions. The primary purpose of this re-definition is to force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input.

Why must we emphasize output? First, because a nation of concerned free citizens and skeptical taxpayers is naturally more interested in what is harvested than in what is sown. By measuring the value of output in terms of national objectives the country can rationally decide what resources it should allocate to the Navy. Input categories such as manpower, ships, aircraft, and training are of little help in trying to determine why we need a Navy or, if we do need one, how big it should be and what it should be prepared to do.

Second, focusing on missions helps tactical commanders to keep objectives in mind. ASW tacticians often over-concentrate on killing submarines when their ultimate objective is to ensure safe maritime operations. An example of a good sense of objectives was the Israeli achievement of air superiority in the 1967 war. Even though air superiority is traditionally thought of as a function of dogfight tactics, the Israelis recognized that shooting the enemy from the air was not the objective. Destroying Egyptian aircraft was. They employed deep surprise attacks on enemy airfields to successfully achieve this objective.

Third, an amorphous mass of men, ships, and weapons is difficult to manage because it is difficult for an individual to visualize. By subdividing these masses into their expected output, or missions, we are able to establish priorities for allocating resources, to know how much we are spending for different objectives, and to judge their consonance with national strategy.

Mission categorization is useful in less abstract decision making also. For instance, we shall propose that the Sea Control mission is executed by tactics of sortie control (barrier operations), choke point control, open area operations, and local defense. Different platforms have different utility in each of these tactics. Generally speaking, VP aircraft are best for open area operations; surface escorts best for local defense, and submarines best for choke point operations. Although each of these forces has secondary applications, resource distribution among them will be dictated by our evaluation of which tactics are going to be most important to us.

Categorization of mission tactics can also be used at even more detailed levels of resource allocation. A submarine designed for choke point operations should emphasize quietness at the expense of speed; a submarine for local or escort defense needs speed even at the expense of quietness. If we understand this, we will trade off speed versus quietness according to our evaluation of probable employment.

Fourth, an understanding of missions assists in selecting the best among several competing systems. A research program may develop five new air-launched munitions, but we may not be able to afford production of more than three. We shall divide tactical air projection tactics into deep interdiction, battlefield support, close air support, and counter air/antiair warfare. Each of these makes slightly different demands for weapons. While precision is mandatory for deep interdiction, it is critical in close air support. Surely in our mix of three new weapons we will want at least one that stresses accuracy. If this seems obvious, an examination of history will show that the military has sometimes become hypnotized by the weapons needed or used in one particular tactic or mission to the neglect of newly emerging requirements.

Finally, stressing missions helps to ensure that members of the organization focus on the whole rather than on one of its parts. This can help keep vested interests in proper perspective. Even the most professional, well-motivated individual can become so committed to a particular missile system, type of ship or aircraft, or special personnel program that he loses sight of what is best for the whole organization.

II. EVOLUTION OF NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS

How did the Navy come to define the four mission areas as Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence? It was evolutionary. Navies have not always had each of these missions nor is this likely to be the definitive list of naval missions.

The first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control. A classic example of the importance of being able to move military forces by sea is the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. The Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the wall. The Athenian admiral, Themistocles, turned the tables by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut off from reinforcement and resupply, the Persians left Athens and Attica.

A few decades later, in the Peloponnesian Wars, Athenian Sea Control repeatedly permitted outflanking the land-based Spartan campaign. In the Punic Wars, Rome's exercise of Sea Control prevented the Carthaginians from being able to support Hannibal. And so it went. There were many technological milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initiatives, but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the safe movement of ground forces and their supplies across the sea.

In time, trade routes flourished, exploration became more far ranging, the horizons of imperialism widened, commerce grew, and with it, piracy. Nations began to demand security for their endeavors. Broad command of the sea became the sine qua non of economic growth and well-being. The nature of Sea Control evolved to include the protection of shipping for the nation's economy as well as its overseas military expeditions. By the same token, denial of an enemy's use of the seas for commerce as well as military purposes became an important element of warfare--blockade hurt economies and war-making potential.

By the early 19th century, another important naval mission had evolved—the projection of ground forces from the sea onto the land. While there are many examples of landing operations throughout military history, amphibious warfare in the modern sense began during the Wars of the French Revolution. Examples are the British amphibious assault operations at the Helder (1799) and Aboukir (1801). Ground troops traditionally transported by sea to some staging area began to use sea platforms as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was given to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through amphibious assault. This also extended the traditional Sea Control mission. In addition to protecting supply reinforcement and economic shipping, navies now had to protect the amphibious assault force.

Also during the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplomacy" came into the naval vocabulary. In the quest for colonies, nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate sheiks and pashas and to serve warning on one another. In time the range of this activity extended from warning and coercion to demonstrations of goodwill. It has come to be known as the Naval Presence mission. Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore by amphibious means and Naval Presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.

During that war, naval tactical air was used primarily in the Sea Control mission (e.g., Midway, Coral Sea, and Battle of the Atlantic) and secondarily in direct support of the amphibious assault mission. When the war ended, however, there was no potential challenger to U.S. Sea Control. In essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a continuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in quest of new missions. Two arose.

The innovation in missions came from the final stages of World War II, when naval tactical air power played a role in the bombing of the Japanese home islands. Postwar improvements in aircraft and munitions made it logical to extend this use of naval air power. In a sense, the tactical air projection mission was born. The Navy staked out its claim to the use of air power in support of land campaigns: strategic air attack on enemy industry, transportation, and cities; air superiority over the battlefield; and close air support of ground forces. Its value was demonstrated early in the Korean campaign where there were few alternative means of providing air support ashore.

The second innovation in naval missions came with the introduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national military requirement. The combination of improved aircraft performance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft carrier capable of contributing to this new mission. With the Navy struggling to readjust its missions to peacetime needs and the U.S. Air Force establishing its own place in the military family, it is understandable that there was a sense of competition for this new role. However, by the mid-1960's, the development of the Polaris submarine concept eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy.


At about the same time, the dramatic and determined growth of the Soviet naval challenge caused mission priorities to begin to shift and brought about a resurgence of traditional Sea Control requirements. Today, the balance of naval resources and attention devoted to each of these four missions, Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore

and Naval Presence, is especially difficult because of their complex interdependence and because almost all naval forces have multimission capabilities.

The distinction between the four missions is primarily one of purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and interdependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we carefully examine each mission individually. We must know what each mission's objectives are so that we do not overlook some useful new tactic or weapon and, so that we can strike the proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.

III. DEFINITION OF NAVAL MISSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THEIR FORCES AND TACTICS

Strategic Deterrence Mission



INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

Our strategic deterrence objectives are:

- To deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies;
- to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and
- to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.

In support of these national objectives, we have three principal military "tactics" or force preparedness objectives. The first is to maintain an assured second strike capability in the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Today that means dissuading the Soviets from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by maintaining a strategic attack force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any enemy even after he has attacked us. The Navy's Polaris/Poseidon/Trident forces are fundamental to this deterrence because of their high nuclear survival probability.

A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only a

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

portion of our strategic forces, would it then make sense for the United States to retaliate by striking Soviet cities, knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to strike our cities? In these circumstances we would need the alternative of controlled response. This means making our strategic strike forces quickly responsive to changes in targeting and capable of accurate delivery. SSBN forces can be well tailored to these requirements.

A third objective is to <u>deter third powers</u> from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. Because of the great disparity between any third country's nuclear arsenal and ours, the same forces deterring the Soviet Union should deter others.

Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic forces which will not let us appear to be at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to allow the opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is markedly superior to ours, we would find that political decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must always keep in mind the balance of power image that our forces portray to the non-Soviet world. In part, this image affects what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence. In part, it affects how we talk about our comparative strength and how we criticize ourselves.

In summary, the strategic deterrence mission is subdivided into four tactics:


S T R A T E R R E N C E

- . ASSURED SECOND STRIKE
- CONTROLLED RESPONSE
- . DETER THIRD POWERS
- . BALANCE OF POWER IMAGE

There is very little overlap between strategic deterrence and other Navy mission areas at present. However,
significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could reduce
the ability of SSBN's to survive without assistance from
friendly Sea Control forces. With this exception and the
fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential for
nuclear strikes, naval forces for strategic nuclear deterrence are almost exclusively devoted to that mission.

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

Sea Control Mission



INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

The term "Sea Control," derives from the traditional phrase "control of the sea." This change in terminology may seem minor, but it is a deliberate attempt to acknowledge the limitations on ocean control brought about by the development of the submarine and the airplane.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, we passed through a period of maritime history in which full regulation of the seas in wartime was the ambition of Great Britain. Initially, this could be accomplished through possession of a superior sailing fleet. The enemy's harbors were closely watched by patrolling cutters and frigates. Ships of the line were called forth to defeat the enemy or at least to force him back into port whenever he dared to sortie. Later, when steam propulsion afforded ships greater mobility, the British found that they needed both coaling stations and control of vital choke points around the world. The intention was still to be able to move a superior fleet into position for a showdown engagement before an enemy had the opportunity to use the seas for his advantage. The term "control of the sea," as used by Mahan, meant both denying use of the seas to the enemy and asserting one's own use.

British and German naval strategies in World War I reflected this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of the seas. Hence, caution dominated the tactics of Jutland. Germany challenged British reliance on a superior battle fleet by first employing surface ship commerce raiders, then by unrestricted submarine warfare. The British reacted by attempting to blockade the German U-boat with mines layed across the exit to the North Sea. It failed. Few naval strategists understood how radically the concept of "control of the seas" was altered by the advent of the submarine. British, German, Japanese, and American preparations for World War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions. Only a few voices pointed out that an additional submarine might be more useful than another battleship or two.

Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However, in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engagement of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that it was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. By the end of World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one's

enemy while asserting one's own exclusive use had been overtaken by technology. On the one hand it was nearly impossible to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other, there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy air power would make the assertion of one's presence prohibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after the second World War, the U.S. Navy had such a monopoly on sea power that the term "control of the seas" understandably continued to carry its long established connotation.

The new term "Sea Control" is intended to connote more realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable today to temporarily exert air, submarine, and surface control in an area while moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the most limited sense, to totally control the seas for one's own use, or to totally deny them to an enemy.

This may change with evolving technology and tactics but, in the meantime, we must approach the use of the term "Sea Control," from two directions: denying an enemy the right to use some seas at some times; and, asserting our own right to use some seas at some times. Any sea power may assert its own right to use the seas and deny that right to the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided between the two objectives. For instance, in Figure 1 if the United States were attempting in wartime to use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, it would be operating near the left side of the diagram with the greater percentage of its effort on asserting sea control. situation like the Vietnam War, we operated on the right extreme, since our use of the seas was not challenged, but we did make a substantial effort to deny the other side access to Haiphong. An opponent, of course, will usually respond with countering objectives and tactics as in the lower half of the figure.




FIGURE 1

Four U.S. National objectives which call for asserting our use of the sea and by the same token denial of them to an opponent are:

- To ensure industrial supplies.
- To reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas.
- To provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies.
- To provide safety for naval forces in the Projection of Power Ashore role.

There are four different tactical approaches for achieving these Sea Control objectives:

Sortie Control: Bottling up an opponent in his ports or on his bases can still be attempted. As opposed to the 18th and 19th century tactic of forcing a major fleet engagement at sea, today's blockade seeks destruction of individual units as they sortie. If we assume an opponent will be in control of the air near his ports, sortie control tactics must primarily depend on submarines and mines.

If successful, sortie control is a most economical means of cutting off a nation's use of the seas or ability to interfere. Nevertheless, such established techniques have their disadvantages. No blockade is 100% successful. Some units may be beyond the blockade when hostilities commence and will remain to haunt opposition forces. Against the enemy's aircraft there is no static defense. Planes must be bombed at their bases. Thus we must conclude that blockades are weapons of attrition requiring time to be effective. But the lesson of history is perhaps the most instructive of all: ingenious man has usually found ways to circumvent blockades.

Choke Point Control: Sometimes the best place to engage the enemy is in a geographical bottleneck through which he must pass. In so doing platforms like ASW aircraft that probably could not survive in the area of the enemy's sortie point can be used. This also requires patience.

Once an enemy's forces have cleared sortie and choke point operations, there are two remaining tactics for dealing with them.

Open Area Operations: Once the enemy is loose at sea or in the air, surveillance and search systems can assist

in locating and putting him at bay. Aircraft are perhaps the most appropriate platform because of high search rates. Here again, though, time and patience are required.

Local Engagement: In contrast to searching out a large area, we can let the enemy come to us. If we are asserting our use of the seas this means that his attacking aircraft, ships and/or submarines must close our forces to within weapon release range. This enables us to concentrate our defensive forces around the units to be protected. Defensive forces may consist of surface escorts, submarines and whatever aircraft can be brought to the scene, VP, VS, VF, and VA. These forces may attempt to destroy the enemy's launching platform prior to weapon release or may attempt to deflect, or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. If we are denying use of the seas to someone else, local engagement amounts to positioning forces in a limited region and waiting in prey.

The weapons employed in these four tactics are numerous, their selection depending on timing and the situation. The same weapon may be used to assert our control or to deny control to an opponent. This multimission character of many weapons systems often causes misunderatanding of the boundary between Sea Control and the other naval missions. Figure 2 shows the weapons systems applicable to specific Sea Control tactics.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS APPLICABLE TO SEA CONTROL TACTICS

TACTICS WEAPONS SYSTEMS	SORTIE CONTROL	CHOKE POINT CONTROL	OPEN AREA OPERATIONS	LOCAL DEFENSE
SUBMARINES	X	×	X	X
ASW AIRCRAFT		x	×	X
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT	:	×		x
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS	x	×	x	x
ATTACK AIRCRAFT	x	×		
MINES	X	×		
ESCORT SHIPS	x	×	×	×

FIGURE 2

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

In executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques deserve particular mention:

Deception: Assertive Sea Control objectives do not necessarily demand destruction of the enemy's force. If the enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability to press an attack, we will have achieved our Sea Control objective. Force routing, deceptive/imitative devices, and other antisearch techniques can be employed, often in combination with other tactics.


Intimidation: The perceptions of other nations of our Sea Control capability relative to that of other major powers can influence political and military decisions. What any nation says about its capabilities influences the challenges that are offered or accepted.

In summary, Sea Control tactics include:



- SORTIE CONTROL
- CHOKE POINT CONTROL
- . OPEN AREA OPERATIONS
- LOCAL ENGAGEMENT
- DECEPTION
- INTIMIDATION

Projection of Power Ashore Missions



INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

Sea Control is concerned with what happens on, under and over the ocean surface. Projection of Power Ashore is concerned with the impact of naval forces on land forces and can be divided into three categories: amphibious assault, naval bombardment, and tactical air.

Amphibious Assault Projection: Ships have long been used to transport military power to conflict areas. As noted earlier, assault from the sea in the face of opposition began to develop as a naval mission in the early 19th century. The calamitous assault at Galliopli in 1915 and subsequent failure to distinguish poor execution from good strategy lowered enthusiasm for this mission. However, World War II and the Korean conflict testified to its continuing importance.

Amphibious assaults are opposed landings on hostile territory and have four objectives:

- To secure territory from which a land campaign can be launched and supported. We do this by assault from the sea in several circumstances. One is when there is no other practical approach, that is the enemy territory is a geographical or political island. Another is when we want to outflank and surprise the enemy. The Okinawa and the Normandy landings in World War II are examples. The purpose of the assault on Okinawa was to secure a base from which to launch the invasion of Japan. In Normandy, the assault launched the attack into heartland Germany.
- To secure land area from which an air operation can be launched and supported. One of the costliest amphibious assaults during World War II was launched against Iwo Jima to gain a site from which the Air Force could strike Japan.
- To secure selected territory or facilities to prevent enemy use of them. The first offensive action of World War II in the Pacific was the capture of Guadalcanal to deny the Japanese the airfield facilities from which they could interdict U.S. supply routes between Pearl Harbor and Australia.
- To destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, divert his effort, etc., by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.

Amphibious tactics are classified by the size of the operation:

COMPARISON OF AMPHIBIOUS TASK ORGANIZATIONS

	MAF*	MAB	MAU*	RAID
TROOPS	TO 33,000	8000-12,000	1800-4000	50-250
SHIPS	43-52	15-17	4-6	1-2
HELOS	250-300	75-120	30-36	10-14
ATTACK AIRCRAFT	50-60	18-20	6-8**	2-4**
BOATS	320-350	001-08	30-40	2-10
GUNFIRE SUPPORT	8-10 8" 22-30 5"/54	12-14 5754	2-4 5"/54	0-3 5"/54

*MAF - MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MAB - MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
MAU - MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT

FIGURE 3

These rough force compositions are by no means rigid. There are many specific ways in which amphibious assault forces can be tailored to the particular requirements at hand. Obviously the landing force must be adequate in size to handle the tasks assigned ashore. As the size of an assault increases, there are two factors that scale upward more than proportionally to the number of troops to be landed. One is the number of specialized units that are required such as command, control and communications ships or facilities; minesweeping capability; aircraft and gunfire support. The other factor is the time to assemble, sail, prepare the landing area and assault. The larger the operation the more complex it becomes with attendant delays and risks of enemy advance defensive preparations.

Finally, when little or no opposition is encountered, such as in Lebanon in 1958, amphibious forces can be landed "administratively." They can then be employed as regular ground forces if supported. Administrative landings are considered amphibious operations only when the unique over-the-beach capability of amphibious force is an essential element.

Naval Bombardment: Although most commonly associated with amphibious assault, bombardment can have three separate objectives:

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

- To provide direct support to troops operating near a coastline.
- To interdict movements along a coastline.
- To harass military or civil operations in coastal areas.

Bombardment is presently available from naval guns in destroyers and cruisers. There are two tactics: either direct or indirect fire control can be employed depending on the distance of the ship and target from shore. Targets can be prearranged geographically, called by observers on the beach, or selected visually from a ship or aircraft. The accuracy of fire can be spotted from on board ship, from ashore, or from an aircraft. In time, even conventionally armed missiles may also be employed in this role.

Tactical Air Projection: Tactical air power is used to achieve three objectives:

- Destroy portions of the enemy's warmaking potential.
- Provide support to a ground campaign directly or by interdicting enemy support to the engaged areas.
- Deny an enemy these same options against us.

There are four basic tactics by which these objectives are achieved: deep interdiction; battlefield interdiction; close air support; and counterair/anti-air warfare.

Deep Interdiction: Attacks conducted to destroy, neutralize, or impair the enemy's military potential before it can be directed against friendly forces are deep interdiction. Targets assigned may be military or civilian, remote from the battle area and perhaps more strategic than tactical. To prevent the enemy from moving forces and material under the protective cover of darkness or adverse weather, an all-weather attack capability is important.

Battlefield Interdiction: Sometimes referred to as Direct Air Support (DAS), battlefield interdiction differs from deep interdiction in two ways: targets are usually military and of immediate tactical importance, and air space control must be closely coordinated with front line support operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict the enemy's capability to move supplies/reinforcements or maneuver his forces.

Close Air Support: Close air support is direct support to front line ground forces, generally exercised much as is call-fire support from field artillery. Therefore, very close coordination with gunfire support elements is necessary.

Counterair/Anti-air Warfare: In order to conduct the three types of air strike operations, counterair forces are employed to neutralize the enemy's air capabilities to minimize expected attrition of our forces. The threat over enemy territory may be surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), anti-aircraft guns (AAA) and/or fighter interceptor aircraft. Counters to these range from attack on enemy air bases or weapons sites to direct protection with our fighters or electronic countermeasures. When the situation is reversed, and an opponent is projecting his air power over our territory, anti-air warfare operations come into play. Fighters, SAMS and AAA are employed exacting attrition on enemy aircraft.

All of these tactical air projection tactics are carried out by attack aircraft supported as feasible and necessary by fighter-interceptor air superiority forces. One of the values of categorizing air projection missions is to identify the aircraft and weapon characteristics and tactics best suited to each mission. Figure 4 does this with some of the principal aircraft and weapon characteristics.

AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION MISSIONS

(H-high; M-medium; L-low;)

DEEP INTERDICTION BATTLEFIELD SUPPORT SUPPORT COUNTERAIR

Н	M	L	н
Н	M	н	Н
н	M	L	M
M	M	Н	M
Н	M	L	M
Н	M	M	-
Н	M	L	Н
Н	M .	M	_
Н	M '	L	M
Н	M	L	L
L	M	H	-
Н	н	H	-
Н	M	L	-
	H H H H H H L H	H M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M	H M H H M L M M H H M M L H M M M H M M L H M M M

Figure 4

There will be specific scenarios where some of the judgmental evaluations in Figure 4 will be incorrect. It would be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons. Unfortunately, the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence, some evaluation of probable use and likely need can be valuable.


Before leaving the projection mission, we would note that only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore missions. weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults on choke points or tactical air strikes on enemy air bases can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission. Sea-based tactical aircraft are used in Sea Control missions for anti-air warfare and against enemy surface combatants. The distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the operation. Is the objective to secure/deny use of the seas or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance, much of the layman's confusion over aircraft carriers use stems from the impression that they are employed exclusively in the Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean's surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to play in both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.

In summary Projection of Power Ashore Tactics are:

PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE

- Amphibious Assault
 - MAF
 - MAB
 - MAU
 - Raid
- Naval Bombardment
 - Direct
 - Indirect
- Tactical Air
 - Deep Interdiction
 - Battlefield Interdiction
 - Close Air Support
 - Counter Air/Anti Air

Naval Presence Mission



INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

Simply stated, the Naval Presence mission is the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. The use of presence forces is for two broad objectives:

- To deter actions inimical to the interests of the United States or its allies.
- To encourage actions that are in the interests of the United States or its allies.

We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two tactics: preventive deployments and reactive deployments. The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a crisis (reactive). In a preventive deployment our force capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems which might arise and clearly cannot be markedly inferior to some other naval force in the neighborhood, but can rely to some extent on the implication that reinforcements can be made available if necessary. On the other hand, in a reactive deployment any force deployed needs to possess an immediately credible threat and be prepared to have its bluff called. If another sea power, such as the Soviet Union, is in the area, a comparison of forces will be inevitable.

In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider what size and composition of force is appropriate to the situation. There are basically five actions with which a Naval Presence force can threaten another nation:

- Amphibious assault
- Air attack
- Bombardment
- Blockade
- Exposure through reconnaissance

In addition, almost any size and type of presence force can imply that the United States is concerned with the situation and may decide to bring other military forces to bear.

All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the threat of major air attack on a small oil sheikdom would not be credible, but the threat of an amphibious assault on the capital might be; or, sailing a major fleet to show support for a small government threatened with insurrection might be more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps prompting over-reaction.

When selecting a <u>Naval Presence</u> force, we must also take into account how the countries that we want to influence will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly different categories of national perceptions:

The Soviet Union: When contemplating a U.S. presence force, the Soviets must assess their comparative naval strength available over time, and the expected degree of U.S. resolve. Their principal strength comparison would probably be on which country can exercise sea control in the area in question since the United States is not likely to pose a threat of projecting power directly against the U.S.S.R., except in a worldwide crisis of the most serious proportions.

Nations Allied to the Soviets: Nations with close ties to the Soviets must assess relative U.S.--U.S.S.R. capabilities in the particular circumstances. These powers will be asking the questions, "Can the United States project its assembled power onto my shores? and "Can the U.S.S.R. deny them that capability?" Thus third nation appraisal of relative sea control strengths may be the most critical factor. We should note, however, that third power assessments may not correspond to the assessments either we or the Soviets would make of identical military factors.

Unaligned Third Nations: There will be cases where a nation is not able to invoke major power support in a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such a country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to project its power ashore to influence events in that country itself.

Thus, the naval presence mission is simultaneously as sophisticated and sensitive as any, but also probably the least understood of all Navy missions. A well-orchestrated naval presence can be enormously useful in complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, naval presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. If used ineptly, it can be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence objectives,

scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, there will never be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.

In summary, the tactics of the Naval Presence mission are:



- PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENTS
- RESPONSIVE DEPLOYMENTS

IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES INVOLVING NAVAL MISSIONS AREAS

The United States, as we have seen, has performed the four basic naval missions for many years. Yet the dynamic nature of world conditions demands a continuing reassessment of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative emphasis on their individual tactics. National priorities change; the nature of the threat changes. Only by understanding the complex interdependence between naval missions and their elements can we expect to be able to allocate resources wisely and prepare for the future rather than the past.

Some of the key issues which must be addressed are:

<u>Intra-Mission Issues</u>

Strategic Deterrence

• Can we maintain our <u>balance of power image</u> and accent <u>controlled response</u> without appearing to be developing a first strike capability?

Sea Control

- Will probable scenarios allow time for attrition tactics?
- Can <u>local engagement</u> forces be made more effective?
- Should future SSN's be designed for employment in barriers (attrition) or as escorts (local engagement)?

Projection of Power Ashore

Amphibious Assault

- What size assault force is most likely to be needed?
- Should we design lift forces and tactics differently for different size assaults?

Naval Bombardment

- Should the vanishing 6-inch and 8-inch guns be replaced?
- Is there a place for bombardment by non-nuclear missiles?

Tactical Air

- How much high performance capability is needed (or can we afford) for deep interdiction?
- What tactical application could V/STOL aircraft best fulfill?
- In what way are electronic warfare requirements influenced by the different tactics?

Naval Presence

 Are there different operating policies that would yield a greater presence capability?

Inter-Mission Issues

Strategic Deterrence vs. General Purpose Forces

- How much of the Navy's resources belong in Strategic Deterrence?
- Should sea-based missiles be favored over the other elements of the TRIAD and assume a greater role in Strategic Deterrence?

Sea Control vs. Projection of Power

• Does the increased size of the Soviet Navy signal the end of our freedom to project power from sea sanctuaries and justify shifting more resources into Sea Control?

- Did our Vietnam experience diminish the probability of future projection wars?
- Are "Lo-mix"* Sea Control forces incompatible with the Projection of Power?

Presence vs. Combative Missions

 Is the Presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?

Obviously we cannot resolve these issues of intermission priority in a vacuum. We must consider both what our national political objectives are and what any potential opponent is doing. Our principal military concern, of course, is the growing Soviet Navy. The evolution of their post-World War II navy would indicate that they started with a sea denial orientation as evidenced by their emphasis on submarines. There are those who argue that this was intended only to deny us access to waters from which we could Project Power into the Soviet Union. There are others who contend that their sea denial capability now includes being able to interdict our resupply operations over a wide span of oceans. It also seems clear that the Soviet Navy has chosen to exercise its Naval Presence capabilities aggressively. Whether they look on this as a fall-out of their other capabilities or have done so deliberately is difficult to assess. the advent of Soviet aircraft carriers and the continuing expansion of their amphibious forces, there is a growing question of whether they have ambitions for Projection of Power Ashore capability. If so, it would logically be accompanied by assertive Sea Control capabilities to defend their projection forces. Even smaller non-allied navies, such as the Chinese, must be taken into account. the Soviets, are starting with a sea denial orientation. With relatively simple sea denial weapons such as anti-ship missiles and mines proliferating and extending in reach, the threat of sea denial in restricted waters from even the smallest navies may well increase in the future.

There will always be this constant flow and counter flow of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation. Perhaps

^{*}When we think in the accustomed terms of projection of power from sea sanctuaries, we incline toward larger, more cost-effective, and more efficient platforms (the "hi" of the "hi-lo mix"). Sea Control favors numbers of units because operations will likely spread to numerous areas; the "Lo" side of the mix.

it is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, the changing nature of world political relationships demands a continual updating of naval capabilities to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the Navy's missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs. Unless we do, we will be left behind attempting to use yesterday's tools to achieve today's objectives.

F

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

M

1

Approved For Relea





Vincent Davis, Director Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies

March 27, 1974

VADM Stansfield Turner, USN President, Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Stan: -

Many thanks for your letter of March 20 with your final travel plans, although we are sorry that you must arrive later than we had hoped and depart sooner than we had hoped. If the situation changes in the meantime such that you could stay in Lexington perhaps overnight on Saturday, April 6, that would be great with us.

LCDR Robert Trammell, USNR, the Commanding Officer of our local Naval Reserve Training Center, has generously consented to send a Navy car to pick up you and your Aide when you arrive at the Cincinnati airport on American Airlines Flight #283 at 1500 EDT on Friday, April 5. Also, LCDR Trammell will provide the same Navy car to get you back to the Cincinnati airport in time for your departing Allegheny flight at 1524 EDT on Saturday afternoon, April 6.

CAPT Robert Brewer, USNR-R, is more or less our SOPA for all USNR activities in Kentucky. Bob lives here in Lexington, and he and I agree that we should get at least a little Navy-type mileage out of your visit to the Bluegrass. Therefore, in view of the fact that you and your Aide will need to eat breakfast starting around 0700 on Saturday morning in any case, we are going to arrange for perhaps a dozen of our local USNR leaders and friends to join you for breakfast in a private dining room at The Springs where you will be staying. I assume you will be willing to make a few informal comments on major issues and challenges facing the CNO and the Navy at the moment, and to handle a few questions from our group.

Yes, we have made all arrangements and reservations for you and your Aide at The Springs. See you soon!

Cordially,

Vincent Davis

Programs of Professional Development, Research and Service in World Affairs for Kentucky, the Nation and the Global Community





PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island 02840

. 20 MAR 1974

Dear Vince,

Just a short note to firm up our arrangements for April 5-6. I'll be arriving in Cincinnati at 1500 on the 5th via American 283 with my Aide. If it's inconvenient for you to meet us, we'll rent a car for the two days and drive down to Lexington, arriving about 1700. I assume you'll arrange reservations at The Springs, or wherever the conference will be held.

I'm afraid I must miss your afternoon with the "sport of kings"; it seems that Allegheny doesn't go out of their way to provide service on Saturdays. If I stayed for the races, we couldn't get back until after midnight. We'll have to leave by car about 1230 to catch a 1524 Allegheny flight in Cincinnati.

Looking forward to seeing Lexington. In the mean-time, warmest regards.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Professor Vincent Davis, Director Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies The University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506



PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island 02840

14 FEB 1974

Dear Vince,

First, thanks for the Abrahamsson-Steckler book. It is a most thorough and useful compendium. A lot of this information gets bandied about carelessly and inaccurately. I am delighted to have this available for reference. In addition, it ties in nicely with some things we are doing on the campus. I hope that a number of our people will make good use of it. Thanks for sending it along.

In response to your letter on the April conference, how can I possibly turn down A Day at the Races? It certainly sounds most exciting, even though I have little experience at a racetrack. I will look forward to a very pleasant-sounding afternoon. I'll be in touch a bit later on the details of my travel arrangements.

Your thoughtfulness in suggesting that the honorarium might go to the <u>Naval War College</u> Foundation is very nice. I think that can be arranged and would appreciate it.

On the topic of my remarks, I think I would like to deal with something very much like my talk in Chicago to the Janowitz conclave. Perhaps we could label it "Detente and Changing Requirements for Military Force".

Look forward very much to being with you. In the meantime, warm regards.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Professor Vincent Davis, Director
Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies
The University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Approved Earlesse 200 1/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1



The University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506 (606) 257-4666

4 February 1974

Vincent Davis, Director Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN President -- U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Stan:

We are truly delighted that you can and will be here with us for our 5-6 April conference, as noted in your letter of 29 January. My only regret is that the rules in your ballgame will not allow you to accept the honorarium or travel expenses. Is there any way that you could accept the honorarium and then endorse it over to the Naval War College Foundation?--just a thought.

I don't know what kind of luck you will have on flights from Colorado Springs (the Air Force Academy, I assume, where I have many friends, and where I used to do a lot of guest lecturing in my Denver years). Another of our guest speakers for 5-6 April is Professor Fred Sondermann of Colorado College in Colorado Springs, and I think he plans to get here on Thursday evening, 4 April. However, if you can arrive here anytime on Friday afternoon, 5 April, even if this means you won't get here precisely at our noon starting time, this will be OK with us. We will meet you at the airport on arrival. The airlines have used the oil shortage to cut back on service to smaller cities like Lexington.

Your best bet might be a TWA flight from Denver to Cincinnati. You could doubtless get the Air Force Academy to drive you in a staff car from the Academy to the Denver airport (about a 75-minute drive), or there are short-hop flights from Colorado Springs to Denver. Then, at Cincinnati, we could send a car to meet you or you might prefer to get a rental car and drive yourself. The Cincinnati airport is 12 miles south of the city in Kentucky, or about a 75-minute drive down to Lexington via I-75.

On your departure from Lexington on Saturday, 6 April, we very much hope that your departing flight will not leave here before mid-afternoon or early evening, because we have lined up what we think might be a special treat for our four guest speakers plus our host party. The first day of the spring racing season at our super-beautiful local track, Keeneland, is 6 April. We have made

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

Turner 2/4/74 Page 2

arrangements for a clubhouse luncheon and a special box at the track, starting around 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. The races run from about 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., but you could leave whenever convenient in middle to late afternoon. I think there is an Allegheny flight leaving here about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. for Providence via Pittsburgh. It's the flight that I usually get when I fly up to visit you. By the way, all of Kentucky (except for a few suburban counties immediately south of Cincinnati) is now on CENTRAL DAYLIGHT TIME (the eastern half of the state including Lexington was formerly on EST). Thus, if you arrive and/or depart via Cincinnati, you will have to make note that Lexington is one hour earlier on the clock than Cincinnati.

Anyway, back to the Keeneland races, we thought that this informal arrangement for Saturday afternoon might be a pleasant way for our guest speakers to wrap up their visit with us. The Keeneland spring season is considered here to be a warm-up for the Kentucky Derby and the Churchill Downs spring season starting the first Saturday in May at our neighbor city of Louisville (75 miles west of Lexington). Keeneland is to the horse set what Newport is to the yacht set (and many people belong to both sets). It's a colorful and festive part of our local scene here.

As for meeting with some our local Naval Reserve people (including "Blue & Gold Team" members), we are going to set up a breakfast on Saturday morning, 6 April, from about 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. You've got to eat somewhere, and this will let us make an informal Navy session out of breakfast. The breakfast will be at the same motel/hotel where you will be staying here: The Springs, where the phone number is (606) 277-5751, in case you need to leave a phone number with your office at the War College. Other local numbers where you could be tracked down while you are here include: (606) 257-4666/4667 [Patterson School]; 255-8259 [my home]; 252-3488 [Spindletop Hall, for the Friday evening session]; 258-8233 [Trustees Board Room, for the Saturday morning session].

I look forward to getting your travel schedule and your response to queries in this letter, plus the topic that you want us to use for your talk (please don't make it too parochial Navy, or I'll eatch hell from some of my local Army colleagues), whenever you have all of this put together. Thanks again!

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CFA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

LEXI <u>್ಟಿ</u> Ap**p**roved s still Gloucescer Line),
ninent on mailbox at driveway entrance--red bric ranch-type house with incongruous nautical-appe flagpole. If lost, phone (606) 255-8259. Keeneland Track and the Airport to the Westmorland Gate, or only .7 mi. west of the yellow brick go one block on Gloucester Drive, turn right (it's still Gloucester Drive), and then turn legt if arriving from west, going east on U.S. 60, only .4 mi. past Airport Motel (get in left lane 04/11/23 News ROS -- about 9 mi. west of heart of Lexington via U.S. 60 (Versailles Road), or about 2 mi. west of into the first driveway--name and number are prominent on mailbox at driveway entrance--red Pircle turn (the first few streets on the left are rather new)--this 6th left is Gloucester Drive; from I-7 turn north through Westmorland Entry Gate and continue straight ahead to the 6th (and last) Exit Calumet Farm WESTMORLAND AREA IS OVERSIZE horse NOT DRAWN TO SCALE farms Keene-Track 1and Race The Versailles Road airport church church and the Champlin gas station to the Westmorland Gate; or Yellow brick Champlin gas Creek Elkhorn 09 Salis-Salisbury bury Gloucester U.S. Gloucedter Drive Drive and slow down when passing Airport Motel); cull-ded sac (Margo Ct VKaren Ct Square North Carleton Dr Wyse South Drive Airport Motel WESTIMORLAND ENTRY CATE Laity of ankfort edsaillds U.S. 60 U.S. 60 -RDP80B01554R003600230001-1 own of

pproved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1 500 PM USAFA

The University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506 (606) 257-4666



Vincent Davis, Director Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies

January 11, 1974

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN President -- U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Stan: -

Don't panic when you see your name on the attached tentative program. I had to produce a few copies for our planning committee, and it was just as easy to mimeograph as to xerox.

However, the purpose of this letter is indeed to invite you to accept this assignment, and therefore to keep your name in place when we make up the final program.

The emoluments include room, board, transportation, any other out-of-pocket expenses, plus \$300.00 honorarium.

This would be neither the largest nor the most prestigious audience that you ever addressed--mainly, about 40 faculty members from all of the colleges and universities in Kentucky and in the surrounding areas of adjacent states, plus some ROTC people. there are several additional reasons why we would be delighted if you could accept:

(1) On the side, we could get good press and TV coverage on your visit in connection with our Naval Reserve activities in this area, and I assure you that we can use all of this blue-andgold publicity that we can get here. This tends to be Army country, and we have to work hard to keep the Navy flag flying.

(2) On the personal side, we would be most pleased to extend some Blue Grass hospitality, in view of your great hospitality to me in recent years. Our weather is ordinarily pretty nice in early April, and you might enjoy a box seat on the opening day of races at our beautiful local track (which is part of the build-up for the Kentucky Derby in Louisville a month later).

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Warm regards,

'incent Davis

Programs of Professional Development, Research and Service in World Affairs for Kentucky, the Nation and the Global Community

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1
THE PATTERSON SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE
The University of Kentucky --- Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Tentative Program -- National Security Seminar

For Kentucky Area Colleges and Universities

Friday, April 5, 1974

riuay,	Whi	. ولا لمد.	<u>1974</u>	
1:00	to to	Noon 1:00 1:15 1:30	Registration Lunch (informal) Welcoming remarks Break	[NOTE: All events from 11:00 to 5:45 will be at The Springs Motel, 2020 Harrodsburg Road, Lexington, Kentucky.]
1:30	to	3:30	SESSION #1: "Is Mil	itary Power Obsolete?"
			Professor Klaus Kinmediately follow	norr, Princeton University, wed by
			Curtis Harvey, Pa	sion chaired by Professor tterson School and Depart- , University of Kentucky
3:30	to	3:45	Break and Coffee	.*
3:45	to	5:45	SESSION #2: "Nation	al Security Studies on Campus"
				Sondermann, The Colorado ely followed by
			Maurice A. East,	sion chaired by Professor Patterson School and Depart- Science, University of Kentucky
5:45	to	6:15	Alumni Club, Spindle	niversity of Kentucky Faculty- etop Hall, Ironworks Pike, for s on Friday, April 5, 1974
6:15	to	7:00	Refreshments (downs	tairs rathskellar)
7:00	to	8:00	Dinner (private din	ing room)

Professor Charles Moskos, Northwestern University, immediately followed by...

Roundtable Discussion chaired by Professor George Herring, Patterson School and Department of History, University of Kentucky

10:00 to 11:15 Nightcaps and entertainment by "The Times Squares" Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

8:00 to 10:00 SESSION #3: "The Military and American Society"

Tentative Program -- National Security Seminar (continued)

Saturday, April 6, 1974

7:00 to 8:30 Breakfast as individually desired

[NOTE: All of the Saturday events will be held in the Board of Trustees Lounge and Board Room, 18th Floor, Patterson Tower, University of Kentucky campus, about 5 minutes by auto north of The Springs. Coffee and breakfast rolls will be continuously available starting about 8:00 throughout the morning.]

8:30 to 10:00

SESSION #4: "Issues and Challenges with the U.S. Military: An Insider's Perspectives"

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, President, Naval War College, immediately followed by...

Roundtable Discussion chaired by Colonel Charles Brindel, Director, Army ROTC Program, University of Kentucky

10:00 to 10:15 Break

10:15 to Noon SESSION #5: "Trends in U.S. Defense Policy"

Professor Vincent Davis, University of Kentucky, immediately followed by...

Roundtable Discussion chaired by Professor Sheldon Simon, Patterson School and Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky

Noon to 1:00 Lunch, closing remarks and adjournment

1:15 Check out at The Springs, for those who did not do so earlier at breakfast time

NOTE: Some may wish to attend the first day of the spring season at Keeneland Race Track on Saturday afternoon, April 6.

PHONE NUMBERS: The Patterson School (606) 257-4666/4667

The Springs 277-5751
Spindletop Hall 252-3488
Trustees Lounge and Board Room 258-8233

[This is a tentative program 1/23 CTA FOW minor changes are possible.]



The University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506 (606) 257-4666

Vincent Davis, Director Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies

February 19, 1974

VADM Stansfield Turner, USN President, U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Stan: -

OK, we'll label your talk "Detente and Changing Requirements for Military Force" here on April 5-6.

Delighted you can stick around long enough for a "Day at the Races" on that Saturday afternoon, April 6.

And we'll get you the honorarium check for you to convey to the Naval War College Foundation. Tell "Rafe" Bates we're thinking of him.

We will expect to get your exact travel schedule whenever you have it, later on, for the April 5-6 visit.

I think that Harvey and the rest of us made a little progress at that meeting in Washington with Jim and others on February 9-10. Harvey can brief you on it, if he hasn't already. The main frustration is the issue: How much good does it do to funnel ideas to a lameduck CNO?

Warmest regards,

Vincent Davis

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

02840

PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE FOR 3 - 6 APRIL 1974

Wednesday, 3 April (Service Dress Blue)

0600 - Depart by President's car for T.F. Green

0700 - Allegheny Flight 486

0810 - Arrive National Airport - Met by CNO car

0845 - Call on RADM Grojean

0900 - Call on CNO

0915 - Call on SecNav

0945 - CNO car to Arlington Annex

1000 - Call on RADM Bill Read

1050 - CNO car to National Airport

1115 - United Flight 277

1209 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1340 - Continental Flight 17

1555 - Arrive Colorado Springs - Met by USAFA representative

1800 - Informal buffet

2000 - Address to Cadet Defense Policy classes

RON BOQ

Thursday, 4 April

0700-0800 Breakfast

0830 - Conference convenes

(Lunch with Cadet Wing)

1830 - Cocktails

1930 - Dinner followed by Address

Friday, 5 April

0645 - Breakfast

0730 - USAFA car to Airport

0800 - Continental Flight 20

1157 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1305 - American Flight 283

1501 - Arrive Cincinnati. Met by NRTC car (LCDR TRAMMEL)

1600 (1 hr) - Arrive The Springs Motel, 2020 Harrodsburg Road, Lexington, Kentucky

1745 - Drive to University of Kentucky Faculty-Alumni Club, Spindletop Hall, Ironworks Pike

1815 - Refreshments in Rathskeller

1900 - Dinner

2000 - 2200 Session #3 "The Military and American Society": Moskos.

RON at The Springs

Saturday, 6 April

0700 - Breakfast at The Springs with local Naval Reservists

0830 - Session #4 - "Issues and Challenges with the U.S. Military: An Insider's Perspectives" - VADM Turner

Roundtable chaired by COL Brindel, Director, Army ROTC, University of Kentucky

1000 - Break

1015 - Session #5 - "Trends in U.S. Defense Policy" - Vince Davis

1230 - Depart for Cincinnati by NRTC car

1524 - Allegheny Flight 818

1755 - Arrive Logan/Boston. Met by President's car

1930 - Arrive NavWarCol

PEOPLE

WASHINGTON	Room #		Telephone #
RADM Grojean	4E572		OX-52453
CNO	4E660	:	OX-56007
Chief Carpenter	4E658	,	OX-54412
SecNav	4E710		OX-53131
RADM Read	Bu Pers_2711		OX-41291
(Mr. John Manwell	1776 K St. NW		833-8400)
USAFA: Conference		AVN	259-2270
 BOQ	Suite	4	259-3127
MAJ Doug Mi	ırray Home		259-1389
		3€ 130~	
KENTUCKY The Patters on School	ol	(606	257-4666/7
The Springs Motel (Qtrs)		277-5751
Spindletop Hall (Fri	iday)		252-3488
Trustees Lounge &			258-8233
Mrs. William Drews -	 175 E. Delaware Place, Chicago	Apt 8803 (312) 664-5342
Mr. Richard D. Harza	- 150 South Wacker Dri	ve, Chicago	- Office: (312) - 855 - 7000 Home: (312) -446 -7280
Mr. C. Keith Shay - 44	15 Cedar St., Winnetka		(312) – 236 – 4500
Mr. LeRoy F. Nichals	on 18 Lindenwood Dr Littleton, Colo	ive, rado	(303) 798-5718

Mr. Brady Black - Cincinnati Enquirer (5
Approveditor Release 2001 11/23 t. CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

(513) 721-2700

THE PATTERSON SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE The University of Kentucky --- Lexington, Kentucky 40506

in cooperation with

The National Strategy Information Center, Inc., New York and
New York University Graduate Program in National Security

PARTICIPANTS -- NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION SEMINAR

Professor Bernhard Abrahamsson Graduate School of International Studies -- Cherrington Hall University of Denver Denver, Colorado 80210

Professor Damian A. Barthle Department of History Jefferson Community College Louisville, Kentucky 40201

Professor Clyde T. Bates Georgetown College Georgetown, Kentucky 40324

Professor William Bowker Department of Government Centre College Danville, Kentucky 40422

Colonel Charles Brindel, USA Director Army ROTC Program University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor John K. Brown Hazard Community College Hazard, Kentucky 41701

Professor Robert L. Burke Department of History Murray State University Murray, Kentucky 42071 Dr. Morris K. Caudill Dean of Undergraduate Programs Morehead State University Morehead, Kentucky 40351

Lieutenant James T. Chapman, USN Naval ROTC Program Instructor University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

Lt. Commander David G. Clark, USN Aide to the President U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Captain James P. Connell, USA Army ROTC Program Instructor University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

Professor Vincent Davis
Director and Patterson Chair
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Dudley E. DeGroot Department of Anthropology Eckerd College St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

NSES PARTICIPANTS

Professor Maurice A. East
Associate Director [also faculty
Department of Political Science]
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Gene J. Garfield Department of Political Science Murray State University Murray, Kentucky 42071

Professor Curtis Harvey Department of Economics University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Roy O. Hatton Department of History Murray State University Murray, Kentucky 42071

Professor George Herring
Department of History
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Charles W. Johnson Department of History University of Tennessee Knoxville, Tennessee 37916

Major Russell L. Johnson, USA Army ROTC Program Instructor Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana 47401

Professor Lewis M. Kirk, Jr.
Department of History and
Political Science
Kentucky State University
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

Professor John Kleber Department of History Morehead State University Morehead, Kentucky 40351

Professor Caroline Krebs
Department of Political Science
Bellarmine College
2000 Norris Place
Louisville, Kentucky 40205

Professor Philip G. Laemmle Department of Political Science University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

Major Paul Lewis, Jr., USA Graduate Student Department of Political Science Atlanta University Residence: 601-A Miller Drive Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330

Colonel William A. Lusby, USAF Director Air Force ROTC Program University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45221

Professor Robert F. Maddox Department of History Marshall University Huntington, West Virginia 25701

Professor Robert D. McAninch Department of Political Science Prestonsburg Community College Prestonsburg, Kentucky 41653

Professor Kevin G. McCullen Department of Political Science Union College Barbourville, Kentucky 40906

NSES PARTICIPANTS

Professor Charles Moskos
Department of Sociology
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois 60201
[on leave for the 1973-74 year
at University of Texas (Austin)]

Mr. George Muns
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Glen Murrell Division of Social Sciences Paducah Community College Post Office Box 1380 Paducah, Kentucky 42001

Professor Paul David Nelson Department of Political Science Berea College Berea, Kentucky 40403

Professor Dennis J. O'Keefe Department of Political Science Northern Kentucky State College Highland Heights, Kentucky 41076

Captain Glenn C. Peck, USAF Air Force ROTC Program Instructor University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor John H. Petersen Department of Government Western Kentucky University Bowling Green, Kentucky 421.02

Professor Robert L. Peterson Department of Political Science University of Tennessee Knoxville, Tennessee 37916 Mr. Philip A. Reemes
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Ms. Dianne Reif
Assistant to the Director
Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Professor Abdul H. Rifai Department of Political Science Berea College Berea, Kentucky 40403

Professor Chun W. Ro Department of Political Science Paducah Community College Post Office Box 1380 Paducah, Kentucky 42001

Professor Carl G. Ryant Department of History University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

Professor Andrew K. Semmel Department of Political Science University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio 45239

Professor Sheldon Simon Department of Political Science University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Captain M. E. Smith, USN Director Naval ROTC Program University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208

NSES PARTICIPANTS

Professor Fred A. Sondermann Department of Political Science The Colorado College Colorado Springs, Colorado 80903

Professor Troy M. Stewart, Jr. Department of Political Science Marshall University
Huntington, West Virginia 25701

Professor Jack W. Thacker, Jr. Department of History Western Kentucky University Bowling Green, Kentucky 42101

Professor Robert Toohey Elizabethtown Community College Elizabethtown, Kentucky 42701

Lt. Commander Robert Trammell, USNR Commanding Officer Naval Reserve Training Center Springhill Drive Lexington, Kentucky 40503

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN President U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840 THE PATTERSON SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE The University of Kentucky --- Lexington, Kentucky 40506

in cooperation with

The National Strategy Information Center, Inc., New York and
New York University Graduate Program in National Security

FINAL PROGRAM

Friday, April 5, 1974

	to	Noon 1:00 1:15	Registration Lunch & Welcome Break	[NOTE: All events from 11:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. will be at THE SPRINGS, 2020 Harrodsburg Road, Lexington.]
1:15	to	3:15	SESSION #1: "Natio	nal Security Studies on Campus"
			Professor Fred A.	Sondermann, The Colorado College
				on chaired by Professor Sheldon of Political Science, UK
3:15	to	3:30	Break and Coffee	
3:30	to	5:30	SESSION #2: "The M	Military and American Society"
			Professor Charles	Moskos, Northwestern University
			Follow-up discussi Herring, Departmen	on chaired by Professor George t of History, UK
5:30	to	6:00		UK Faculty-Alumni Club, Spindletop, or all other events April 5, 1974
6:00	to	6:45	Refreshments	
6:45	to	7:45	Dinner	
7:45	to	9:45	SESSION #3: "Econo	mics, Politics and Strategy"
				Abrahamsson, Graduate School of lies, University of Denver

Follow-up discussion chaired by Professor Curtis

(...continued)

Harvey, Department of Economics, UK

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

NSES FINAL PROGRAM (continued)

Friday, April 5, 1974 (continued)

10:00 to 11:00 Nightcaps, and entertainment by "The Time Squares"

Saturday, April 6, 1974

7:00 to 8:15 Breakfast as individually desired

[NOTE: The Saturday morning sessions will be held in the Board of Trustees Room, 18th Floor, Patterson Tower, UK campus, about 5 minutes by auto north of The Springs. Coffee and breakfast rolls will be available for breaks.]

8:30 to 10:10 SESSION #4: "New Strategic Perspectives [as seen by a Professional Career Officer]"

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, President of the U.S. Naval War College

Follow-up discussion chaired by Colonel Charles Brindel, Director Army ROTC Program, UK

10:10 to 10:20 Break

10:20 to Noon SESSION #5: "Trends in U.S. Defense Organization"

Professor Vincent Davis, Patterson School, UK

Follow-up discussion chaired by Professor Maurice A. "Mickey" East, Patterson School, UK

12:15 to 1:00 Closing lunch back at The Springs

1:15 Check out at The Springs (if not checked out earlier)

THANKS FOR COMING, COME BACK TO SEE US AGAIN, AND LET US KNOW IF THE PATTERSON SCHOOL CAN EVER BE OF FURTHER SERVICE TO YOU!

[NOTE: If the weather is nice, some may wish to attend the first day of the spring racing season at Keeneland on Saturday afternoon.]

PHONE NUMBERS: The Patterson School (606) 257-4666/4667

The Springs 277-5751
Spindletop Club 252-3488
Trustees Board Room 258-8233



THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

The Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce

Program of Study

The Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce offers an interdisciplinary M.A. degree and serves in an advisory capacity with respect to the Ph.D. programs in international studies within the four departments — Business Administration, Economics, History, and Political Science — primarily related to the Patterson School.

The typical M.A. candidate will spend three semesters (one and a half years) on campus. The M.A. degree program can be tailored with considerable flexibility to meet the career needs of any particular student. Appropriate courses can be selected from the relevant offerings of virtually all parts of the University, including the Colleges of Agriculture, Allied Health, Law, Medicine, and Social Professions. The M.A. program is especially useful for the student desiring a career in any of the nonacademic fields in foreign affairs, such as international banking, international business, international journalism (foreign correspondent), or service in such governmental agencies as the U.S. Department of State and international organizations such as the United Nations.

Research Facilities

Students at the Patterson School have full access to the main University library and appropriate specialized libraries, as well as to the University's computer facilities and certain specialized research institutes and programs, when relevant.

Financial Aid

A limited number of full (\$2500 per academic year) and partial (less than \$2500) Patterson Fellowships are available for highly qualified students. Patterson Fellowships are considered nonservice, and are therefore tax exempt. No other forms of aid are routinely available, although Patterson School officials can provide some information on job opportunities for students or their spouses and information on various student loan possibilities.

Cost of Study

The 1973-74 tuition for Kentucky residents is \$265 per semester, or \$530 per academic year. Tuition for out-of-state students is \$630 per semester, or \$1260 per academic year. These tuition rates include all mandatory fees. A student health service fee (optional) is \$7 per semester. Textbooks average \$100 per semester. All Patterson Fellowship holders, regardless of residence, pay only the tuition rate for Kentucky residents.

Cost of Living

In 1973-74, on-campus University housing for single graduate students varies from \$292 to \$674 per semester, and from \$95 to \$120 per month for married students. University food service varies from \$224.50 to \$293.50 per semester per student. Costs for commercial or private off-campus housing and food vary from somewhat below to well above the costs given for University accommodations. Student life at the University is quite informal, and costs for such things as clothing, laundry, and leisure activities are below the national averages in these categories.

Student Body

The Patterson School's student body is small and carefully selected, with no more than 15 to 20 students currently being admitted each year. Some are single, some are married. Most are from the United States, but some are from other nations. Most are in their twenties, but some are older students with professional experience in ongoing foreign affairs careers. Currently, about half the student body is male. About 25 percent of the students are Patterson Fellowship holders.

The Community

The University campus is a cohesive unit located six blocks from the heart of Lexington, a city of modest size (160,000 in the greater Lexington area) in the center of the famous Bluegrass region. Noted for the breeding of thoroughbred, standardbred, and saddle horses, the Bluegrass region immediately surrounding Lexington includes more than a hundred of the most celebrated horse farms in the world. The nearest major city is Cincinnati, a one-hour drive to the north via I-75. The University has long enjoyed a close and cordial relationship with the surrounding community, which can best be described as a pleasant small city in an idyllic farming region.

The University and The School

The University, founded in 1865, is the largest (about 20,000 students) and most prominent institution of higher education in the state, with the full range of programs and activities associated with a major university. A friendly, informal atmosphere prevails. Diverse athletic, cultural, and recreational opportunities exist within the University and the general community.

The Patterson School enjoys especially cordial ties with all parts of the University, as well as with many elements within the community. To supplement and complement its professional training program, the School also serves as a research center for international studies, Activities within this context include two research conferences each academic year bringing together from 75 to 100 distinguished scholars from around the world. The School publishes a semiannual newsletter and twelve paperback research monographs (the Sage Professional Papers in International Studies series) each year.

The School also organizes and sponsors, often in partnership with other organizations, a variety of programs designed to serve Kentucky, the nation, and the global community. Examples include an annual one-day world affairs institute for high school students and a similar one-day institute for adults. The Patterson School cooperates closely in a number of ways with the International Studies Association and with such other specialized professional societies as the Oral History Association.

Applying

Application forms for admission to the M.A. program of the Patterson School and applications for a Patterson Fellowship should be requested from the address given below. The deadline for applying for a Patterson Fellowship is February 1 for the following academic year, with successful prime candidates notified in mid-March and successful alternates notified somewhat later. Applications for admission only may be submitted at any time, but it is strongly suggested that they be submitted prior to mid-May for the following academic year in order to assure adequate time for processing and decision. Each application must include, in addition to the standard forms, transcripts from all previous colleges and universities attended, at least three letters of academic reference, a personal statement of career goals from the applicant, and GRE scores. Successful applicants for admission will ordinarily have a grade point average of at least 3.0 (on a 4.0 scale) and a combined verbal and quantitative GRE score of about 1200 or higher.

Correspondence and Information

The Director
The Patterson School of Diplomacy
and International Commerce
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Telephone: (606) 257-4666 or 4667

(over)

THE FACULTY

The Director of the Patterson School and Patterson Chair Professor of International Studies is Dr. Vincent Davis, who received his Ph.D. in political science from Princeton University in 1961. Dr. Davis, who has held regular faculty appointments at Princeton, Dartmouth, and the Graduate School of International Studies (Denver), served for six years as the first Executive Director of the International Studies Association. His teaching and research specializations are international politics, foreign policy, and military policy. Working closely with Dr. Davis is the Associate Director, Dr. Maurice A. East, who received his Ph.D. in political science from Princeton University in 1969, and is now Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky.

In addition, the Patterson School has more than 50 faculty associates who work closely with the School's students but hold their primary appointments in other University colleges and departments, including Agriculture (Agricultural Economics), Anthropology, Business Administration (International Business), Communications, Economics, Geography, History, Law, Medicine (Community Health), Political Science, Psychology, Social Professions, Sociology, and Statistics.

An occasional Visiting Scholar in Residence is part of the Patterson School's research program. Each year, numerous distinguished guests visit the Patterson School for periods ranging from a day or two to several weeks. In the years 1972-74, these distinguished quests have included:

Bernhard Abrahamsson, Director of Scientific Research, Israel Shipping Research Institute.

Samir Anabtawi, Professor, Vanderbilt University.

Joseph Black, the Rockefeller Foundation

Kenneth Boulding, Professor, University of Colorado. Donald Easum, U.S. Ambassador to Upper Volta. Philip Farley, Director, U.S. Arms Control Agency.

Robert Gard, Major General, U.S. Army.

Federico Gil, Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Denis Healey, former Defence Minister and Member of Parliament, Great Britain.

Thomas Hughes, President, Carnegie Endowment.

Wynfred Joshua, Stanford Research Institute.

Olav Knudsen, Professor, University of Oslo.

Donald Marcus, the European Common Market.

Ali Mazrui, Professor, Makerere University, Uganda.

Zdravko Mlinar, Professor, University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.

George Reid, Office of the Prime Minister, Barbados.

Dean Rusk, former U.S. Secretary of State.

John Sheehan, Governor, Federal Reserve System. Neil Sheehan, *The New York Times*.

Yuri Shvedkov, Institute of U.S.A., Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Kalman Silvert, Professor, New York University, and the Ford Foundation


John Paul Vann (deceased), Senior U.S. Adviser, U.S. Mission to South Vietnam.



In the foreground is a statue of Dr. James Patterson, first President of the University of Kentucky. His bequest endowed the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, whose Patterson Tower is shown in the background.



A Patterson School student confers with Dianne Reif, Assistant to the Director; Dr. Vincent Davis, Director; and Dr. Maurice A. East, Associate Director.



Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 02840

PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE FOR 3 - 6 APRIL 1974

Wednesday, 3 April

(Service Dress Blue)

0600 - Depart by President's car for T.F. Green

0700 - Allegheny Flight 486

0810 - Arrive National Airport - Met by CNO car

0845 - Call on RADM Grojean

0900 - Call on CNO

0915 - Call on SecNav

0945 - CNO car to Arlington Annex

1000 - Call on RADM Bill Read

1050 - CNO car to National Airport

1115 - United Flight 277

1209 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1340 - Continental Flight 17

1555 - Arrive Colorado Springs - Met by USAFA representative

1800 - Informal buffet

2000 - Address to Cadet Defense Policy classes

RON BOQ

<u>Thursday, 4 April</u>

0700-0800 Breakfast

0830 - Conference convenes

(Lunch with Cadet Wing)

1830 - Cocktails

1930 - Dinner followed by Address

Friday, 5 April

0645 - Breakfast

0730 - USAFA car to Airport

0800 - Continental Flight 20

1157 - Arrive O'Hare/Chicago

1305 - American Flight 283

1501 - Arrive Cincinnati. Met by NRTC car (LCDR TRAMMEL)

1600 (1 hr) - Arrive The Springs Motel, 2020 Harrodsburg Road, Lexington, Kentucky

1745 - Drive to University of Kentucky Faculty-Alumni Club, Spindletop Hall, Ironworks Pike

1815 - Refreshments in Rathskeller

1900 - Dinner

2000 - 2200 Session #3 "The Military and American Society": Moskos

RON at The Springs

Saturday, 6 April

0700 - Breakfast at The Springs with local Naval Reservists

0830 - Session #4 - "Issues and Challenges with the U.S. Military: An Insider's Perspectives" - VADM Turner

Roundtable chaired by COL Brindel, Director, Army ROTC, University of Kentucky

1000/- Break

1015 - Session #5 - "Trends in U.S. Defense Policy" - Vince Davis

1230 - Depart for Cincinnati by NRTC car

1524 - Allegheny Flight 818

1755 - Arrive Logan/Boston. Met by President's car

1930 - Arrive Nav WarCol

SAGE PROFESSIONAL PAPERS IN Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B61554R003000230001

NTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Edited by VINCENT DAVIS and MAURICE EAST, Patterson School of International Studies, University of Kentucky

This series-12 Professional Papers each year-concentrates on studies of theoretical or empirical significance in the field of international studies. Papers range in length from 32 to 96 pages; articles are published which ere too long for normal journal publication, yet too short to become books. Suitable for classroom adoption.

Editorial Advisory Board

Wendell Bell, Yale University Nea E. Cutler, University of Pennsylvania Alexander George, Stanford University A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa, Makerere University, Uganda

Charles F. Hermann, Ohio State University Charles W. Hultman, University of Kentucky

Olay Knudsen, University of Oslo Ronald A. Krieger, Goucher College Edward L. Miles, Graduate School of nternational Studies, Denver Zdravko Mlinar, University of Ljubljana Claire Nader, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Laura Nader, University of California, Berkeley

Dean G. Pruitt, State University of New York at Buffalo George L. Reid, Office of the Prime

Minister, Barbados Martin Shubik, Yale University and the RAND Corporation

lan Smart, Royal Institute of International Affairs, England

Fred A. Sondermann, The Colorado College

John E. Turner, University of Minnesota

Subscription Rates (Paper Edition, unbound):

USA and Canada: \$21.00 yearly; individual professionals may subscribe at \$12.00 yearly; UK, Europe, Middle East, Africa: £8.00 yearly (£5.40 to individuals). Elsewhere: \$22.00 yearly (\$13.00 to individuals).

Bound Library Edition:

Is available in three clothbound parts (each containing four papers) per year. Subscription price: \$10.00 per part (\$30.00 per year). Regular price (if bound parts are ordered separately): \$12.50 per part (\$37.50 for a complete volume).

Frequency: Twelve papers per year, published in groups of four throughout the

SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD 275 S. Beverly Dr. / Beverly Hills, CA. 90212



VOLUME I (1972)

\$2.80 E. E. Azar, et al., International Events Interaction Analysis: Some Research Considerations (80 pp) 02,002 J. H. Sigler, et al., Applications of Events Data Analy-\$3.00 sis: Cases, Issues, and Problems in International Interaction (96 pp) \$2.25 02-003 J. Burt, Decision Networks and the World Population Explosion: The UN and Institutional Innovation for Social Crisis (48 pp) J. A. Caporaso, Functionalism and Regional Integra-\$2.90 02-004 tion: A Logical and Empirical Assessment (88 pp) E. R. Wittkopf, Western Bilaterial Aid Allocations: \$2.50 02-005 A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received (64 pp) T. L. Brewer, Foreign Policy Situations: American 02-006 Elite Responses to Variations in Threat, Time, and Surprise (64 pp) 02-007 W. F. Weiker, Decentralizing Government in Moderniz-\$2.70 ing Nations: Growth Center Potential of Turkish Provincial Cities (72 pp) \$2.10 02-008 F. A. Beer, The Political Economy of Alliances: Benefits, Costs, and Institutions in NATO (40 pp) C. Mesa-Lago, The Labor Force, Employment, Unem \$2.70 02-009 ployment and Underemployment in Cuba: 1899-1970 \$3.00 P. M. Burgess and R. W. Lawton, Indicators of International Behavior: An Assessment of Events Data Research (96 pp) \$2.70 W. Minter, Imperial Network and External Depend-02-011 ency: The Case of Angola (72 pp) J. R. Redick, Military Potential of Latin American \$2.40 Nuclear Energy Programs (56 pp)

VOLUME II (1973)

02-013	B. H. Steiner, Arms Races, Diplomacy, and Recurring Behavior: Lessons from Two Cases (40 pp)	\$2.10
02-014	C. W. Kegley, Jr., A General Empirical Typology of Foreign Policy Behavior (80 pp)	\$2.80
02-015	G. T. Hilton, A Review of the Dimensionality of Nations Project (80 pp)	\$2.80
02-016	E. Weisband, The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of Lockian Liberalism (72 pp)	\$2.70

Forthcoming . . .

B. Abrahammson & J. L. Steckler, The Strategic \$2.50* 02-017 Aspects of Seaborne Oil D. Mookerjee & R. L. Morrill, Urbanization in a \$2.80* 02-018 Developing Economy (India) 02-019 R. J. Art, The Influence of Foreign Policy on Sea-\$2.40* power: New Weapons and Weltpolitik in Wilhelminian Germany 02-020 D. Druckman, Human Factors in International \$2.90*

*denotes tentative price

Papers 02-021 through 02-024 to be announced.

LIBRARY REMINDER ORDER FORM

(Tear off and forward to your Librarian)

FROM: .

(name)

(department)

Please enter a subscription to SAGE PROFESSIONAL PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. Orders may be placed through your subscription agent, or mailed directly to the publisher:

SAGE Publications, Inc. P.O. Box 776 Beverly Hills, California 90212

(signature)

(date)

PRICE INFORMATION: Unbound subscription (12 separate papers per volume): \$21.00. Bound subscription (in three clothbound parts per volume-with four papers in each part): \$30.00.

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

PERSON.	AL O	RDER	FORM

Relations

Name		
Address	. <u> </u>	
City	State	Zip
	ubscription to SAGE PROFES ${\tt UDIES}$ commencing with ${\tt UN}$	
☐ Volume 2 (1973).		
□ Volume 2 (1973).	losed in the amount of \$	
□ Volume 2 (1973).	losed in the amount of \$	
☐ Volume 2 (1973) my check is end ☐ One year @ \$12.00		

Mail to: SAGE Publications, Inc.

P. O. Box 776

Beverly Hills, California 90210



NAVAIL WAR COLLIEGE REVIEW



ANNUAL REPORT 1973

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 1972-1973

THE REPORT

of the

PRESIDENT



Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1



MISSION OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

HE MISSION OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IS TO ENHANCE THE PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES OF ITS STUDENTS TO MAKE SOUND DECISIONS IN BOTH COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT POSITIONS.

OBJECTIVES

TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PROVIDES STUDENTS A CHALLENGING ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT, ENCOMPASSING A PROGRAM OF INTENSIVE STUDY REQUIREMENTS, GUIDANCE IN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH, AND OPPORTUNITIES TO PROBE INTO PROBLEMS IN SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE FACTORS RELEVANT TO DECISIONS.

THE TOTAL COURSE - COMPRISING STRATEGY, MANAGEMENT, AND TACTICS - IS DIRECTED TOWARD EXPANSION OF LOGICAL REASONING CAPACITY AND ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF CHOICE, RATHER THAN FAMILIARIZATION WITH FACTUAL MATERIAL.

THROUGH THE FULFILLMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES, ITS GRADUATING STUDENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, WILL HAVE ACQUIRED THE VITAL INTELLECTUAL TOOLS REQUIRED TO MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE LEADERS IN ANY ENVIRONMENT WHERE THEIR FUTURE CAREER MAY LEAD THEM.

Volume XXVI, Number 2/Sequence Number 245

September-October 1973

The editorial offices of the Naval War College Review are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published bimonthly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the grade 0-3 and senior; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning Review matters should be directed to its editorial offices.

1

WHY AN ANNUAL REPORT?

An Annual Report is a means used by most educational institutions to advise alumni and friends of the experience of the past year and of future plans. It seems fitting this year that the Naval War College should issue an Annual Report. The college has been reorganized, our educational philosophy rethought, and our objectives changed. It has been a year of experimentation, of trial and error, and now we would like to see where we have been, the achievements, the shortcomings, the lessons learned, and where we are going.

GENESIS OF CHANGE

In the past 90 years the Naval War College has varied its emphasis from the far-ranging concepts of maritime power enunciated by Mahan to tactical doctrine and techniques, to the strategy and tactics of oceanwide naval campaigns, to the position of the United States as the leading power in the international political and military affairs of the post-World War II era. In 1972 it appeared to me to be particularly appropriate to review the curriculum to ensure that it fitted with the changing world and military environment.

Over the past decade three developments appear to have changed the demands which the Navy and its officers face. The first is in the area of U.S. foreign policy and national strategy. Here both form and substance are undergoing fundamental alterations. In this process, the military element is less persuasive than in the past, particularly in the public forum. Our advice is accepted less on the basis of past prestige and precedent. In the emerging aura of detente, the standard rationales for military preparedness are challenged as outmoded and shallow. To be effective today, military strategists require a broad perspective on national strategy. They need, for instance, the breadth to see that the bipolar world we knew and taught for a quarter of a century was really a historical happenstance. It appeared that it was time to hearken back to Mahan's days at Newport, when he and the students studied the historical heritage of the Navy and probed the strategic purposes of having naval forces.

Secondly, we have clearly entered a period in which the ordering of national priorities is forcing very difficult choices between military and nonmilitary expenditures. How this will balance out in the years ahead will depend on many national and international factors. Still, stiff competition for resources must be

2

anticipated. This will require realistic appraisals of the alternative employments of available funds. The amount of funds the Navy receives will be increasingly a function of how our chosen alternatives compare with those of others. This requires officers who can see what another man's alternatives might be, as well as our own, and analyze objectively the strengths and weaknesses of both. In short, it appeared that new emphasis on the economics of defense decisionmaking was in order.

Thirdly, we have left behind the days when the U.S. Navy had clear qualitative and quantitative advantage at sea. No longer can we implicitly count on overwhelming all potential opponents. We must be ready to be more clever and more innovative in our tactics. This, after all, should be our long suit. We have the stronger heritage of experience and success at sea. As long as we do not mistakenly become shackled to traditional tactical patterns, this should be a strong asset. This situation appeared to call for a return to the War College's concentration on naval tactics, as in the 1920's and 1930's, the period of which Admiral Nimitz spoke when he said that the battles of World War II had been war gamed in advance here. In addition, the pace of technology provides today's commander with many more options than his predecessor. We may not be able to anticipate the preferred tactic from amongst those available, but we should be able to identify tactical decision points and the type of choices which will have to be made. Teaching approved tactics, or doctrine, is the province of the training establishment; our concern appeared to be the reasoning process for deriving tactics in light of whatever weapons and sensors may appear on tomorrow's horizon.

If a Naval War College is to serve the Navy and the Nation well, it must improve the officer students' abilities to address in depth these three particular areas. In addition, one very important factor which must also be taken into account in considering what to teach is the experience and attitude of the students. Many officers today have a rather rigid and restrictive view of the decision-making process. Most midcareer officers come from a "Newtonian world"—a world with rational right and wrong answers to fairly clearly defined questions. Much of their experience is with technical systems that demand exact treatment and with the military command environment, which properly calls for unambiguous response. What we need, then, is to construct a course that involves the students with varying kinds of decisionmaking problems, beset with uncertainty and imprecision, the type they

will certainly face in the future. In other words, the task at hand was to design a course that would help them to deal more confidently with decisions involving uncertainty.

After considering many alternative approaches, we chose the study of real world cases of decisionmaking in the three areas of concern. In Strategy this meant scrutinizing the decisions of past strategists and recognizing the rational and nonrational, the precise and imprecise factors that past decisionmakers weighed in balance. In the area of defense economics, it meant looking at cases involving management decisions which highlighted objectives, alternative solutions and their comparisons, and, more importantly, the principles which they imply. In Tactics it meant identifying key tactical interactions and estimating the impact of different courses of action at each potential decision juncture. Overall, this led us to a curriculum that stresses problem solving in each of these three areas, rather than factual data of a contemporary nature. This means teaching how to approach a few representative problems, with the idea that this would prepare the students to handle a variety of problems in their future assign-

PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ACADEMIC YEAR 1972-73

We structured the curriculum to a problem-solving approach, treating the areas of strategy, resource management, and naval tactics. A year has gone by. A graduating class is now performing in many diverse billets. I believe that, as a whole, these officers are better able to approach problems and cope constructively with today's world because of their War College education. Of course, the proof of my belief is as yet conjecture in large measure, but here are some of the evidences which influenced my judgment:

Student Involvement. In the broadest sense, the primary objective of the new curriculum is to sharpen the critical faculties of the students. Accomplishment of this objective was evidenced by many students as time progressed by the improved quality of their seminar discussions and by the type of questions they posed in their seminars and to lecturers. By midyear, for example, a visiting Navy Project Manager was confronted by student questions that revealed feasible alternatives which he previously had not considered. Another measure of the heightened critical

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

faculties of the students came from the comments of our visiting lecturers and panelists who had occasion to observe the students. One visiting professor wrote:

I got the impression—indeed, strong impression—that the curriculum had succeeded in engaging students. They were all involved and, even if they didn't realize it, "engaged." They were thinking about what they were studying, asking questions about the entire endeavor, and it was certainly clear that the program was having an impact upon them—for I encountered no one who was simply neutral or passive. And it seems to me that when a teaching program has this kind of impact—if it produces responses and reaction—then it is, in fact, a successful program.

Individual Effort. The best way for a college to sharpen individual critical faculties is to exercise the reasoning powers of the students to their fullest. We moved in this direction by reducing the number of required lectures on the ground that lectures are a passive learning experience. In their stead, reading requirements quintupled, and writing demands increased markedly. Additionally, examinations were instituted.

Examinations, naturally, were controversial. Overall, they proved beneficial. At the end of the year, the majority of the students endorsed them as a positive learning experience. The principal real hazard of exams was the obvious effort of some students to "win"-to seek the school solution-rather than to learn. This could well have been expected since these officers are highly competitive and since many of them believe that there are right and wrong answers to even complex problems and, hence, to examinations. We tried, but not fully successfully, to destroy this illusion by preparing examination questions that encouraged more than one answer. Our intent was to ask questions that demanded sound reasoning and not the parroting back of memorized factual data. Many different answers could receive a grade of "superior." Even at the year's end some of the students could not accept this and continued to want "right" solutions. The persistence of that tendency is a measure of the degree to which we fell short of our expectations.

Curriculum Focus. Perhaps the most significant change in the curriculum was the deemphasizing of contemporary data and

Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600230001-1

events. This was based on the belief that we should be looking to the long term, the 5 to 15 years that these officers have left to serve the Navy, rather than their next tour of duty. At first this was difficult for many of the students to accept, for, naturally, they are competitively oriented to today and tomorrow. There was also some concern that specific areas of Navy specialty were not being highlighted independently. By covering specialty areas through case studies, we expect to show the student such matters as international law, communications, public affairs, et cetera, in the total context of the Navy rather than in a series of separate and discrete fragments.

Scholastic Discipline. The course applied the lessons of history to the issues of today in order to deepen the students' grasp of the motivating forces in international relations and strategic competition. They, for instance, probed the multiple meanings of the basic terminology, e.g., "limited war," "balance of power," et cetera. Many students did not appreciate that they were making a connection between historical examples and current practice until well into the course or until they were immersed in subsequent courses and looked back. Perhaps the most unique element of the new program was plunging these officers into a scholastic discipline. The starkness of this change forced them to stretch critical faculties.

Faculty Involvement. With the decrease in outside lecturers, more of the teaching workload has passed onto the shoulders of the resident faculty. The faculty has been robust, enthusiastic, and beyond all praise.

The military and civilian professors have been divided into three academic departments: Strategy, Management, and Tactics, rather than by colleges. This is not only an economy of resources, but it also provides one focal point on campus for the development and enrichment of each discipline. Our Naval Warfare students, our Command and Staff students, and our international students all benefit from this consolidation of expertise, technique, and curriculum planning. Within each department a professor is assigned to one or two seminar groups of 12-14 students and charged with guiding his seminar(s) through the entire course his department teaches. Unavoidably, this stretched the expertise of the professor. In many cases the student and professor worked together to uncover the many facets of a problem. At the same

time, these circumstances provided the professors an opportunity to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each of their students and to offer help where most needed. This constant interchange between faculty and students added to the vitality of the academic program.

Contacts with Academia. We have increased the dialog between the War College and civilian academic institutions through the visits of lecturers and panelists who are teaching members of other universities or colleges; through establishing exchanges and working cooperation with a number of universities, especially, of course, our New England neighbors; and through our admittance to the Rhode Island Council on Higher Education and to the Association of American State Colleges and Universities. The benefit of these efforts to the Navy and the War College itself is in the flow of educational ideas they provide, the added intellectual stimulus, and the establishment of communication links with young men and women in academic life.

Advanced Research Program. A new Advanced Research Department was set up at the War College this year. It offers students an opportunity to delve deeply into some specific military related matter. Students who meet the entrance requirements for this program opt out of some of the regular courses and concentrate on their research effort. Fifteen students participated last year. In addition, outside applicants were sought for this program to strengthen and broaden the dialog with the academic world and to bring added intellectual stimulation to the War College campus. At the present time eight outside scholars are participating in this program.

PRINCIPAL SHORTCOMINGS IN ACADEMIC YEAR 1972-73

Unevenness of Faculty. There was too wide a disparity in the knowledge and teaching capabilities of the individual professors. This was occasioned by the introduction of a new curriculum and the required changes in style and quantity of teaching workload. Some students were justifiably disappointed in one section or another of their program. We must correct the problem by exercising greater selectivity in both civilian and military appointments, expending more effort to school and guide new professors, and keeping closer watch over classroom performance and

7

examinations. The experience gained this past year will help immeasurably. As one step designed to improve the teaching experience level of our faculty, more civilian professorial positions have been approved, resulting in a total classroom faculty of 20 civilians and 48 military officers.

Experimentation with Grading Techniques. At the Naval War College, we grade only Superior, Pass, and Inadequate. Establishing the cutting lines between these categories is a soul-searching matter. In efforts to be scrupulously fair in establishing cutoffs, we experimented with having the seminar leader grade his own students whom he understood well; in using "outside" examiners from other seminar groups; and in having various, and sometimes cumbersome, review procedures for borderline cases. The students were divided on which procedure they preferred. So were we. The students, quite legitimately, complained that the changes in grading procedures were both annoying and undue jeopardy. We will publish one set of instructions on grading procedures and abide by it for Academic Year 1973-74. After due consideration, it appears to me that, whatever the theoretical advantages of outside independent examiners, they do not outweigh the fact that at this level, examinations are, and should be, an integral part of the teaching process. Thus the primary grading authority should be the students' seminar leader who, through his knowledge of the individual, can best serve that purpose. This is the course we intend to follow in the future.

Administrative Problems. Academic and administrative functions have been separated and the college organized after the pattern of many civilian universities. The academic departments-Strategy, Management, and Tactics-respond to the academic needs of the colleges while the Colleges provide administrative support to the students. The introduction of a new curriculum coupled with the elimination of normal administrative channels caused some problems that appeared to us, in the larger scheme of things, to be relatively trivial. However, they disturbed some of the officer students to the point of interfering with their academic pursuits. This is perhaps an interesting commentary on the character of our particular student body. Officers who have themselves excelled at running taut organizations understandably expect that type of environment, even in academia. We will smooth out these administrative headaches in Academic Year 1973-74.

Naval Mission Area Papers Exercise. At the end of the school year, the students divided into committees for 2 weeks to write Naval Mission Area Papers (NMAP). Each of these papers analyzed some area of naval warfare; strategic nuclear, air strike, sea control, amphibious, et cetera. At the end of the 2-week period, one flag/general officer met with each committee to discuss the paper.

The quality of the papers was mixed, some excellent, many mediocre. The students were on a very tight schedule, and they were emphasizing contemporary facts and data for the first time in their course here. However, the papers did accomplish the intended purpose of stimulating discussion and thought both in preparation and with the flag officers. The exercise will be repeated next year with the students provided more time for preparation.

Underestimation of Student Capacity. During the first 2 months or so there were many complaints about the tempo of required work. However, once the students regained their study habits and recognized that they could handle the workload, we failed to demand enough of them. In short, as their academic capacity increased, we failed to keep pace by continuing to increase requirements. We expect to correct this.

Professional Knowledge. The Navy students were more narrow in their understanding of the naval service than were other students of their service. This may be due to the complexity of the Navy and its missions. Naval officers in general tended to be expert in one field but knew little about the basic missions and concepts of other branches (e.g., submarines, air, destroyers) of the Navy in which they had not personally served. This reemphasizes the need for a curriculum that will broaden the professional perspective of the midcareer naval officer.

Attitudes Toward the Workload. The change to an academic format and demanding schedule was particularly difficult for some officer students because it was unanticipated. The reality of this academic year was different from their prearrival expectations. On balance, however, most of the students adapted quickly and worked hard, despite being surprised by the curriculum changes. Special credit for dedication to duty—for that is what it was—is due not to the fortunate officers who came to us with high academic records, but to the many officers for whom the rigor of

academic study was a novelty, a hardship, and an unanticipated challenge. Our next class of students will, of course, be forewarned and (to judge from advance reports) forearmed.

Writing Skills. A large percentage of the student body exhibited poor writing skills. (Only about 15 percent of them had had previous duty where extensive writing was most likely to be required.) The required essays, term papers, and examinations improved them. Many left here below acceptable norms; consequently, we are expanding the number of writing assignments.

A REFLECTION ON STUDENT ATTITUDES

I wish to close this recapitulation of the lessons we have learned with some observations on a matter of general concern to the Services, far transcending the college's immediate mission. This is the character, outlook, and intellectual temper of the generation of students with which we deal. They represent the future of the Services. In view of this, I am treating this matter in some detail.

- o The impression these students made on me is one of a lack of conviction on current military programs and policy. At its extremes this verged on a certain agnosticism toward national security goals commonly accepted over the past few years, accepted sometimes in an uncritical way. This tendency may, in part, reflect a general mood of questioning now widespread in the country. Conceivably, too, it may reflect the impact of dramatic sociological changes on the domestic scene which unavoidably have borne more directly on these officers than on more senior ones. Either way, it is worthy of remark.
- o While most officers felt that a prime national security objective was the maintenance of a nuclear second-strike capability, there was no consensus about the size, objectives, and potential employment of general purpose forces. Many believed that we were overextended and overcommitted, while seeing in the Nixon Doctrine a legitimate call for a lower overseas profile and a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces.
- o Most officers projected for the next decade a constant, not an increasing, buying power for DOD. Given that fiscal assumption, a main concern was to enhance our capability to triumph in the event of a sea campaign against the increasing Soviet naval forces. This kind of war-fighting capability would, to all appearances, have to be procured at the expense of forces generally

associated with the projection of naval power ashore, such as carriers and marines. The students recognized that the forces to be traded off were those frequently of higher utility since World War II in situations of political bargaining, diplomatic influence, and actual employment. There were few advocates for expensive weapon systems, an internal contradiction in that the more expensive systems are those designed against the sophisticated Soviet threat. But the paradoxes were not apparent and were not truly confronted.

- © Skepticism about, even an antipathy toward, the word "analysis" was manifested by some of the more senior students. There was a residual hostility, stemming possibly from the McNamara years, toward anything called analysis. There was disbelief in the utility of the explicit structuring of a problem. Some officers felt that the personal qualities and knowledge which had prompted their advancement were sufficient to ensure continued competence and success. Paradoxically, some students approached the Management Course saying: "You can't tell me analysis will give you the right answer, although that is what it is intended to do"; yet left saying: "What good is analysis if it is not intended to give you the one 'right' answer?"
- Students also expressed a dubiety amounting almost to hostility toward the national press, and that appeared to be reciprocated when a group of reporters spent some time at the War College last year. The officers felt that the national press had presented a heavily biased picture of the war in Southeast Asia, while the press claimed the candor and professionalism of World War II days were lacking in the military officers the reporters encountered in Vietnam.
- The students were impressed with the professionalism and candor of congressional staff members who visited the War College. The students came away feeling that Congress sought deeper involvement in defense and fiscal decisionmaking, less bias from Service spokesmen, and more relevant information pertaining to proposed programs.
- From the industrialists who visited us, the students felt they heard a common refrain: the military should eliminate many obfuscating bureaucratic layers and place more trust in industry. Business, they were told, was not out to gather enormous profits from defense contracts; and many more cost overruns are caused by bureaucracy, inflation, and changes in system specification

than by greed. The students were interested in, but somewhat skeptical of, industry.

o When representatives from civilian governmental bureaus arrived to discuss the role of civilian bureaucracy in national security affairs, some of the students were a bit taken back, having had a preconception of a bureaucrat as a bespectacled, meek, nervous little man concerned with job security and the orderly flow of paper. Instead, the students were confronted by articulate, confident individuals sure of their place in the scheme of things and wary of service parochialism.

o The students were rather disappointed with panelists from the Navy, who, the students felt, tended to be defensive, uncommunicative, and committed to defending one point of view against all others. This poses a dilemma. Service spokesmen from Washington are generally staunch advocates for programs. They are looking for allies, not doubters. Students are seeking options, candor, and the reasons for decisionmaking. The purpose and styles of the operational versus the academic arms of the Navy are different, but complementary. National security requires both outlooks, each in its place. One of the purposes of the War College is to provide the students an opportunity to see this contrast

between the needs for objective scrutiny of available options and

for determined advocacy once an option is selected.

To sum up, the year just ended has confirmed the impression which I am sure all senior officers share of the high quality, intense dedication, and seriousness of purpose of younger officers coming forward in the Navy and the other Services today. It has also given me a stronger feeling than before for some of the problems they face. In many ways, in many directions, they are uneasily aware that the ground is shifting beneath their feet—in their domestic circumstances, in their Service experiences, in the changing world scene which they confront, and with which they will have to deal in their time. Taking it all in all, it is understandable that they brought to us not so many verities as previous generations did and also perhaps departed with fewer. But while skepticism is a commendable and useful mental set, it can be carried too far, and I do trust that the college contributed to striking a balance.

I firmly believe that the Services will ignore these facts at their peril. And it should be noted here that the curricular changes instituted at the War College were undertaken not to immure our students from the current scene but, by concentrating their efforts

12

here, to better enable them to deal with it—in their relations with our sister Services, with the political and bureaucratic arenas, and with the broader worlds of the press, of industry, and of society at large on which, in the last analysis, we depend entirely. Alongside the academic curriculum, we intend to do more of this, not less. And in both cases we intend to do it better. It is to these points that I wish, in conclusion, to address myself.

FUTURE PLANS AND PROBLEMS

The changes we have made certainly did not bring unmixed blessings. It will be a number of years before we can confidently assess their impact. In the interim, certain decisions must be addressed in light of the information which we currently have.

Formal Degrees. Our long and rewarding association with George Washington University was terminated amicably this year. Increased student involvement in our own curriculum, brought about by the decrease in outside lecturers and increase in reading and writing assignments, reduced significantly the time available to pursue profitably a cooperative degree program. This was demonstrated by the number of students who attempted both but, because of the heavy demands of the resident program, dropped the George Washington program. Also, the surfeit of officers holding an advanced degree in international affairs reduced the utility of the program to the Navy. Many students were disappointed by this action both because the degree was tangible evidence of academic achievement and because many believed it affected promotion and assignment opportunities. This has raised again the question of possible accreditation at the master's level of our own program. Although many educators agree that the War College program is the full equivalent of a master's program in a civilian university, accreditation would, among other things, limit flexibility in faculty appointments, force the inclusion of unwanted courses in the curriculum, limit authority for course revision, require an act of Congress, and be of little real value to the Military Establishment. However, accreditation is being examined—both full and partial.

Performance Incentives. To attract talented students and faculty, it is imperative that the War College maintain a reputation for excellence. With the termination of the master's program, some

prospective students may question whether diligent application to a formal curriculum is worthwhile. It is all very well to say they will be enriched professionally, but will anyone except themselves know it?

We have moved to make the rewards for excellence commensurate with the individual student's efforts. Those students who achieve recognition as Distinguished Graduates receive substantive fitness reports, many of these are recommended for accelerated promotion, and the appropriate selection boards are being briefed on this change in procedure. Fitness reports for all students contain the statement, "... The Chief of Naval Personnel has recognized completion of this curriculum as the professional military counterpart of an academic master's degree and is so considered for officer personnel management purposes."

In addition, at the completion of each segment of the curriculum, we identify those students who have excelled in that area. I then write a personal letter to the appropriate service Chief of Personnel pointing out that these officers/civilians are particularly well qualified for duty in strategic planning/politico-military affairs or program planning/systems analysis/program management or tactical evaluation and development. Hopefully, these letters will help to place our best performers in top billets in which they are interested and where they will be provided the opportunity to develop the potential they displayed at the War College.

Value of Course to Non-Naval Students. The renewed emphasis on naval matters in our course has raised some questions as to whether the Naval War College is appropriate for the other services, State, CIA, and other civilian agencies. The emphasis on decisionmaking, not current data, does make the Naval War College curriculum applicable to all facets of the Government.

One trimester—Tactics—does concentrate on the employment of naval power. For students not in the Navy or the Marine Corps this course offers the opportunity to acquire a depth of knowledge about a national security mission which should stand them in good stead. All agencies represented here need some analysts and managers who have more than a superficial understanding of the utility and employment procedures associated with naval missions. I hope that these agencies would consider it advantageous to ensure that some of their staff members and managers were so skilled, not only in naval matters, but also in the field of ground combat and land-based tactical air employment.

14

Course Content. The pressures to introduce specific material at the expense of material designed to develop critical reasoning faculties are unceasing. Almost every day someone comes by with a new idea of what has been left out of the curriculum. Most of these ideas relate to items that are high on lists of contemporary concerns. We do not have the time, however, both to treat in depth issues of current interest and to conduct courses aimed at enhancing defense problem solving and decisionmaking.

The coming year will be devoted to consolidation of gains and minor course adjustments dictated primarily by excellent student course evaluations, faculty reactions, recommendations of an independent consultant on curriculum evaluation from a prominent university, and a better understanding of how to achieve our expressed goals. Primary emphasis will be on improved technique with minor changes in course content.

The Strategy and Policy Course will emphasize more strategy and less history, though historical case studies will still be the teaching vehicle. This year's case studies will place greater emphasis on the maritime element of strategy. The course will also incorporate three new seminar topics covering the post-World War II period, but hopefully without getting mired down in the details and emotionalism of current affairs.

The Management Course has been renamed "Defense Economics and Decisionmaking" to reflect more precisely its content. The sequence of course material will be restructured. Quantitative analysis will be taught in the standard college classroom style rather than in seminars. We also plan to incorporate more material on human motivation and the behavioral sciences. A formal course in this area has been designed, and case studies emphasizing the human aspects of decisionmaking and implementation will be introduced in the seminars.

In the Tactics Course the readings on the fundamentals of weapons and sensors will be revised. There will also be increasing emphasis on the analytical steps for deriving tactical procedures.

Faculty. The decision to make the faculty first and foremost a teaching faculty did result in a faculty which, if not overworked, was sorely pressed. I would like to give the faculty more time for individual creativity in order to publish, to attend academic meetings, and to associate with their peers in civilian universities.

The acquisition, as well as the imparting of knowledge, is vital to the long-term health of the War College.

The Student Bodies. Another important area for consideration this year will be the relationship of the College of Naval Warfare (senior course) to the College of Naval Command and Staff (junior course). Only about 15 percent of the CNW students are graduates of any C&S course. This makes it impossible to construct a CNW curriculum that builds on a C&S foundation. Accordingly, our courses have about an 80 percent overlap. This phenomenon actually is not new here, although in previous years much of the common material had different names and was taught by separate faculties. With the largely common curriculum taught by one faculty this year, we noted marked differences between the two groups of students. Whether this was due to age or to the selection process for the War College, I do not know. The officers in the junior course were generally more willing to accept new ideas and concepts. They proved that they could handle the curriculum as well as-and in many cases better than-officers one or two ranks superior. They were intellectually more curious, more involved, more receptive, less conscious of minor prerogatives. They were also less mature and more hasty in reaching conclusions. On the other hand, the exceptional officers-the top 10 percent or so-came from the ranks of the senior course.

This leaves us in a quandary. We definitely want to provide a distinct opportunity for the 15 percent who come here twice. We are moving to do this in part through our Advanced Research Department through which a qualified student may opt out of any portion of the core curriculum in favor of individual research.

Phasing of New Curriculum. The new curriculum described in this report was instituted in toto in the College of Naval Warfare (senior course) in academic year 1972-73. The College of Naval Command and Staff phased into this program in February 1973 with the Strategy and Management Courses. The senior international course, the Naval Command College, participated in the new Management curriculum along with the College of Naval Warfare. In academic year 1973-74 all three of these colleges will draw from the new curriculum, but each will place differing emphasis in the three areas.

The Relevance of War Colleges. The question occasionally arises as to whether these changes we have made at Newport are

implicitly a criticism of the programs at the other four War Colleges. My response to this is emphatically "No." Each War College has a distinct mission. Each has distinct problems and priorities. For instance, one of the primary considerations in altering the curriculum at the Naval War College has been the difficulty in freeing naval officers from the top 10-15 percent of the officer corps to attend. Another problem has been the fact noted above that only about 15 percent of the Naval Warfare College students are graduates of a Command and Staff College. Neither of these conditions pertain at the other War Colleges. The changes we have made have been uniquely tailored to the conditions here. If some of the changes at Newport would be useful to the other colleges, we are anxious to share them and are doing so.

At the same time, our changes here strengthen our position vis-a-vis external critics of War Colleges in general. Higher military education is indeed under scrutiny today. We have strengthened our position by eliminating expensive field trips, by deleting the competing master's degree program, by increasing the academic workload, and by constructing a course that cannot be found elsewhere in civilian or military institutions. Military strategy is not taught on civilian campuses. In the lingering wake of Vietnam, military history is also out of vogue on them. Our Defense Economics and Decisionmaking Course is uniquely tailored to DOD and Navy resource management issues, which are not the focus of civilian business schools. Our Tactics Course is unique to the Navy in every respect. We stand ready to defend the need for this college on these grounds of professional education for our profession alone, but it also has a more far-ranging justification.

This is the need for a center of thinking on maritime matters. If we are indeed a profession and if the Navy has a long-term importance to our country, somewhere, someplace, some people must escape the standard stereotypes and think deeply about the purposes, trends, and future of that Navy. It is difficult to do this in the atmosphere of daily pressures in Washington. Newport is the ideal in many respects by being close yet distant from the day-to-day realities of running the Navy. We need, then, to develop a true university atmosphere here in Newport, one in which, in addition to the teaching that is accomplished, there is a place for research, lectures, symposia, and visiting scholars and military commanders, all to the end of promoting a certain intellectual vigor and stimulus.

CONCLUSION

In summary, I am most encouraged by our experience with the new curriculum. Despite the side effects of being "guinea pigs," the great majority of students clearly enjoyed the challenge and stimulation and felt that they benefited from their year. It was most heartening that this majority had both the zest and the capability to adapt to and master the new academic routine. I feel confident that the experience they have received in this curriculum will better prepare them for the changing demands facing the Navy and its officers.

As I mentioned at the beginning, the War College is presently adapting to the changing trends in foreign relations, domestic sociology and economics, and military technology and balance of forces. If we fail to acknowledge the impact of these trends on our profession, we may miss one of the great historical opportunities for the exercise of maritime power. Whether our particular curriculum will help us to get there or not, it is too early to predict. I believe that we are moving in the right direction. The worst of the trials of change is behind us. Successive classes should savor even greater opportunities.

It was an exciting and stimulating year for me personally. I am grateful for the challenge and the privilege of playing a part in naval professional education. I am particularly grateful for the magnificent dedication and performance of the faculty and staff who adapted to these changes so loyally and successfully, and to the 1972-73 students whose abilities and determination saw the program through its shakedown cruise. I am grateful, also, for all of your forebearance, encouragement, and interest in the contribution of our War College to the U.S. Navy.

STANSFIELD TURNER

APPENDIX LISTING

	Page
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM	. 19
BOARD OF ADVISORS	. 21
BOOKSTORE FOR THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	. 22
BUILDING PROGRAM	. 23
CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION	. 24
CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION LECTURE SERIES	. 25
CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM	. 26
FACULTY	. 27
FINANCIAL REPORT	. 30
LECTURE SERIES	. 31
LIBRARY	. 32
MILITARY-MEDIA SYMPOSIUM	. 33
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE	. 34
NAVAL STAFF COURSE	. 35
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE FOUNDATION	. 36
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW	. 37
NEW CURRICULUM	. 38
RESERVE COURSES	. 45
SENIOR OFFICER MANAGEMENT COURSE	. 46
STUDENT BODY COMPOSITION	. 48
STUDENT FEEDBACK	. 49
WAR GAMING	. 50
WIVES' COURSES	. 52

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM

We have instituted an Advanced Research Program which seeks to provide an avenue by which War College students can pursue a subject in depth and to stimulate interest of scholars in the greater academic community to do work of value and interest to the Navy.

War College students who are accepted in the Advanced Research Program are exempt from some portion of the regular course. They then pursue their research on a full-time basis with only tutorial supervision from the faculty. Most of these projects extend from 3 to 6 months, although one student is remaining at the college for an additional year to engage in this program.

For the civilians who participate in this program, one expectation is that some of these scholars will continue their interest in defense matters, either academically or by serving in the Government. A dimension of intellectual stimulation to the War College will be provided, hopefully, through their work and their visits to the War College. Financial support for these civilian projects has been kept on a relatively modest level ranging from a few hundred dollars to an average of about \$7,000.

Applicants for support both in and outside the War College must submit a written proposal describing the subject, scope, and character of their project, as well as the location and availability of data and a careful estimate of the time required to complete the study. A committee of faculty and staff members at the War College then reviews each submission in terms of its feasibility, usefulness to the Navy, and its standing in comparison with other proposals.

Below are listed projects completed or currently underway, and, once completed, these papers will be circulated to interested offices and individuals.

Naval War College Students

- "After the Cold War: the USIA Role," Mr. Dino J. Caterini, USIA
- "Prejudice, a Motivational Detriment: Thoughts for Military Middle Management," Lt. Comdr. Peter H. Cressy, USN
- "A Theory of Conflict: Towards a Comprehensive Military Theory," Lt. Col. George O. Goodson, Jr., USMC

- "National Security Implications of the U.S. Efforts to Redress the Imbalance of Payments," Brewster R. Hemenway, State Department
- "The Rise of Defense Agencies," John N. Komos, DSA
- "The Nature of Military Advice and Its Role in the Formulation of U.S. National Security Policy," Lt. Col. Richard W. Masson, USAF
- "The Armed Forces Code of Conduct," Lt. Col. Michael P. Murray, USMC
- "Alcohol Abuse and the Prevention of Alcoholism in the U.S. Navy," Comdr. Jeremy R. Tappan, USN
- "The Implications of Naval Disarmament," Comdr. Christos Zirps, USN
- "The Influence of Maritime Strategy on General Purpose Force Planning," Group Project

Participants:

Col. J.J. Grace, USMC
Lt. Col. P.K. German, Jr., USMC
Lt. Col. R.J. Kattar, USA
Lt. Col. R.M. Miller, USAF
Comdr. D.L. Scott, USN
E.A. Thibault, CIA
Capt. G.I. Thompson, USN

Outside Scholars

- "Neo-Mercantilism: Its Embryonic Development in the United States Navy, 1865-1881," John M. Allen, Jr., Syracuse University
- "U.S.—Soviet Arms Interaction, 1941-1970, and a Comparison with Prenuclear Arms Races," Richard H. Cady, Northern Illinois University
- "Origins of a Military-Industrial Complex? The U.S. Navy's Search for Armor and Armament, 1881-1917," Dr. Benjamin F. Cooling, Chief of Research and Reference, U.S. Army Military Historical Research Collection
- "United States Arms Control Policymaking: the Bacteriological Treaty Experience," Forrest R. Frank, Stanford University

- "U.S. Naval War College, 1919-1939, an Institutional Response," Gerald J. Kennedy, University of Minnesota and National Archives and Records Service
- "The U.S. Naval Presence in the Mediterranean," Edward N. Luttwak, The Johns Hopkins University
- "Capabilities, Threats, and American Decisions to Declare War," Peter G. Schoettle, Columbia University
- "Navy Secretaries John Connally, Fred Korth and Paul Nitze," Dr. Paul R. Schratz, Director, International Studies, University of Missouri

BOARD OF ADVISORS

The Board of Advisors is constituted of members invited by the Secretary of the Navy, with the goal of a general balance between representatives from civilian education, business, the professions and retired naval officers. Members serve 4-year terms, normally meeting once annually, although the President frequently seeks the advice and support of individual members on a more informal basis.

Due largely to the number of changes introduced this year, the President asked the board to meet in both October and May. At the May meeting two new members joined the board:

Dr. Robert Bowie Clarence Dillion Professor of International Affairs The Brookings Institution

Dr. William Emerson Director, Division of Research and Publications National Endowment for the Humanities

The same meeting witnessed the farewell to three members whose terms had expired and whose service was of great value to the War College.

Mr. Emilio G. Collado Executive Vice President and Director Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Exxon)

Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, USN (Ret.) Vice President International General Dynamics Corporation

Dr. Thomas W. McKnew Advisory Chairman of the Board National Geographic Society

There are presently four vacancies on the board that should be filled shortly. The remaining members of the board are:

The Honorable Charles F. Baird Vice President (Finance) International Nickel Company of Canada, Ltd.

Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin Retired Military Editor The New York Times

Rear Adm. John J. Bergen, USNR (Ret.) Honorary Chairman of the Board and Director Madison Square Garden Corp.

Mr. Sylvan C. Coleman Chairman and Chief Executive Officer E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc.

Mr. John A. Mulcahy President Quigley Company, Inc.

The Honorable James H. Wakelin, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and Technology

BOOKSTORE FOR THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Through the cooperation of the Navy Exchange system and the University of Rhode Island, a branch of the university's bookstore was established adjacent to the War College campus in time for the opening of college last autumn. Next January it will move into our new academic building, Conolly Hall, and take a prominent position next to the student lounge and coffee mess. As a concession of the Navy Exchange, the bookstore directly supports the Naval War College curriculum through issuing the books which are required reading for the students in each of the three courses.

Students are permitted to retain these course books in the belief that these books will be of lasting use and should become a part of

their professional library. We hope that having ready access to these books will encourage the students to pursue their studies in greater depth in the future. Surely, any process of education must be a continuing one.

The bookstore also stocks fiction, nonfiction, bestsellers, reference, travel books, and many other titles that are of interest to our students and their families. In addition to its immediate resources, the college bookstore can call on the management and inventory of the University of Rhode Island bookstore for any unique requests.

In the bookstore's first year in operation, the college purchased roughly \$161,000 worth of books for faculty and students (all the books for academic year 1972-73 and some of those for 1973-74). Additionally, each month the store sells more than \$3,000 worth of other books directly to students' families and other members of the naval community. Overall, the bookstore has added a valuable academic connection to the life of the Naval War College.

BUILDING PROGRAM

The Naval War College is in the midst of an ambitious building program which dates back to early 1968 and for which we are particularly indebted to past Presidents—Vice Admirals Hayward, Colbert, and Semmes.

Spruance Hall, which houses a 1,000-seat auditorium as well as some faculty offices and seminar rooms, was completed last December. It has already been used extensively for college-wide functions. Pringle Auditorium, which had previously been used for school-wide lectures and convocations, is no longer large enough to accommodate the growing numbers of students.

Conolly Hall, the next unit in the building program, is now under construction and is scheduled for completion in January 1974 and will cost approximately \$4.5 million. Conolly Hall will contain the offices of the President, the Deputy, the Dean of Academics, the Dean of Administration, the administrative departments, and most of the faculty as well as a number of seminar rooms.

A third new academic building, to be named Hewitt Hall, has been funded at \$8.5 million. A contract has been awarded and construction should start this year. Hewitt Hall will be devoted primarily to student facilities.

In addition to these new construction programs, Sims Hall is presently being modified to accommodate improvements in the Naval War College War Gaming Facility.

No less important than these additions to our campus are the new housing units being built for our students at Fort Adams. Sixty new townhouses were available to the students last year and 50 more are coming on the line for the present academic year. In addition, with the departure of all of the fleet units based in Newport, the War College will acquire recently built Capehart housing conveniently located near the college. Once the fleet has departed, we anticipate being able to accommodate all of the students in Navy housing.

These building projects, together with plans currently under study for an improved library facility, are part of the continuing effort to provide the best possible professional education for middle-grade and senior military officers.

CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION

Correspondence courses from our Center for Continuing Education offer an excellent opportunity for professional growth for active duty and inactive Naval Reserve officers who are unable to attend the Naval War College. During this past academic year the center provided the following services:

Average enrollment	1,100
 Percentage active duty officers 	45
 Percentage inactive Reserve officers 	55
New students enrolled during the year	1,650
Students who disenrolled during the year	1,150
Courses completed	550
	6
Certificates awarded to Naval Reserve Officer School	
graduates in major subject areas	145

Gross funding for the Center for Continuing Education amounts to 5 percent of the college budget, with the greatest share being absorbed by military salaries (\$245,000). Civilian salaries amount to \$77,000, while course operating expenses total \$10,000.

As one might expect, changes in the resident curricula must bring about similar changes in our correspondence courses. We are in the process of restructuring the correspondence course program

to the three new course subjects of Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics and Decisionmaking, and Naval Tactics. The next several years will be a period of transition during which students presently enrolled in the old courses will be permitted to complete them while the new courses are being phased in. Specifically, the new course in Strategy and Policy is now available; the course in Defense Economics and Decisionmaking is scheduled to be ready next spring; and the Tactics course should be introduced by next summer.

As an example, the following description of the subject areas of the correspondence course in Strategy and Policy can be compared with the resident course listing in the New Curriculum appendix.

Courses	Subcourse Titles	Hours	Points
S 11	The Sovereign State: Early Strategy and Policy Considerations (This course deals with the Peloponnesian War between Greek city-states in the fifth century B.C., and Thucydides		
	is the author of the basic text.)	36	12
S 12	The Strategy of Total War: Napoleon		
	and Clausewitz	42	14
S 13	The Strategy of Limited War and		
	Alliance Politics: Otto von Bismarck	42	14
S 14	The Origins of World War I	42	14
S 15	The Origins and Strategy of World War II	54	18
S 16	Containment and the Cold War	42	14
S 17	The Military Profession (This course deals with strategy and policy in the somewhat narrower context of civil-		
	military relationships.)	<u>42</u>	<u>14</u>
	Totals	300	100

CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION LECTURE SERIES

In view of the dual role of the Naval War College as an academic and cultural community as well as a center for higher professional education, a voluntary "Contemporary Civilization Lecture Series" was established. This series provided a personal enrichment program for the students, staff, faculty, and wives of the War College. Friends of the school from other commands on the Naval

Base and from the Newport area were also invited to attend these lectures. The subjects covered were intended to be material not related to the college curriculum but of general interest to the students as citizens and informed persons. Speakers for this series appeared as follows:

- Herbert Nicholas, Esq., Rhodes Professor of History and Institutions at New College, Oxford University, spoke on the topic "De Tocqueville Revisited: a European View of the American Political Process."
- Mr. Warren Kiefer, film producer, director, and writer, discussed "The Craft of Film Making."
- Rosamond Bernier, art critic, writer, publisher, and lecturer on famous artists and their work, addressed "Matisse."
- Dr. Buckminster Fuller, architect, philosopher, poet, inventor, and a spokesman for future technology, lectured on "Humans in the Universe."
- Mrs. Richard Button, a teacher in Africa, explorer, botanist, and collector of primitive tribal art, spoke on "Sepik River Art of New Guinea."
- Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr., noted editor, columnist, author, and lecturer gave an informative "Address."
- Professor Sidney Hook from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, formerly head of the Philosophy Department at New York University, gave a talk on "The State of Higher Education in the United States."
- Professor Thomas Wegmann from the Biological Laboratories, Harvard University, addressed the topic "Genetics, DNA, Cloning and the Effects on Society."

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM

Twenty-five years ago the Naval War College inaugurated a program to allow the students to exchange ideas with a wide cross section of the civilian community. Called at first the "Roundtable Discussions" and later "Global Strategy Discussions," the very success of these programs became a problem. Attendance grew from 300 in 1950 to almost 1,000 in 1972, and costs ballooned to \$19,000. Additionally, it was becoming difficult to relate the students' curriculum to the discussions in a meaningful way. The need for a serious revision of the program was clearly evident.

The sheer size of the program was perhaps its most prohibitive element and, as such, was the first addressed. With an emphasis on content rather than numbers, the Secretary of the Navy directed that the program continue essentially in the same format but that the attendance be reduced to more manageable proportions and that the name be changed to "Current Strategy Forum." This year's program was limited to 112 civilian guests representing business, labor, the clergy, the press, and the academic community plus 125 senior Naval Reserve officers performing their 2-weeks active duty for training.

The theme of these discussions, "The Role of the Military in the Post-Containment Era," was dealt with both by student papers prepared in advance of the forum as seminar stimulators and by distinguished guest speakers. The speakers for the 1973 forum in order of their "addresses" were:

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, Governor of Georgia Dr. Alice Rivlin, Brookings Institution Mr. Charles J. DiBona, Special Consultant to the President Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations Vice Adm. Gerald Miller, USN, Commander 6th Fleet The Honorable John W. Warner, Secretary of the Navy

The Current Strategy Forum was the capstone of our academic year at Newport. Bringing our students face to face with both leaders in our civilian community and flag officers highlighted a stimulating, demanding, and informative year.

FACULTY

Strategy Department. Professor Phil Crowl, who was on loan during our first trimester from his position as Chairman for the Department of History from the University of Nebraska, has returned as the permanent Chairman of the Strategy Department. Professor Richard Megargee, who was also on loan for the first trimester last year, has returned from the Naval Academy as a permanent professor. Professors Wilton Fowler of the University of Washington, David Ralston of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Stephen Ross of the University of Texas have also joined the Strategy Department. Professor Martin Blumenson has left for Paris where he is writing on the French Resistance. Professor Josiah Bunting III has left to become one of the youngest college presidents in the country at Briar Cliff College in

New York. Capt. W.W. Erikson has joined the department from Amphibious Group 1 as has Lt. Col. D.L. Frederick, USAF, from the Air War College. In addition, three of last year's graduates, Lt. Col. F.A. Mathews, USMC; Lt. Col. W.P.C. Morgenthaler, USMC; and Comdr. C.H. Nordhill, USN; have been retained in this faculty. Colonels W. Plaskett, USMC; M.J. Krupinsky, USA; and Lt. Col. C. Byrne, USAF; have moved to new assignments.

The seminar teaching teams this year will be:

Professor P.A. Crowl Capt. W.W. Erikson, USN Lt. Col. W.P.C. Morgenthaler, Jr., USMC

Professor F.H. Hartmann Comdr. J.A. Hickey, USN

Professor R. Megargee Col. J.A.R. Guertin, USA

Professor R.F. Delaney Lt. (jg.) C.L. Symonds, USNR Professor J.K. McDonald Ens. D.V. Hicks, USNR Col. J.B. Keeley, USA Lt. Col. D.L. Frederick, USAF

Professor W.B. Fowler Comdr. C.H. Nordhill, USN

Professor D.B. Ralston Lt. Col. F.A. Mathews, USMC

Professor S.T. Ross Lt. Comdr. B.M. Simpson III, USN Professor A.V. Freeman Professor F. Flynn

(Roving international law team)

Management Department. Professor Warren Rogers has relieved Professor Rusty Williams as the department head. Professor Williams moves to a position as Special Assistant to the President. Professors Richard Lloyd and George Brown have joined the department from the Center for Naval Analyses. Professor Philip Gamble has moved to the Naval Command College but will act as a consultant for the Management Department. Comdr. C.P. Hammon, from command of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 5; Lt. Col. J. Hogan, USA, from the U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia; Capt. C. Lewis, from Commanding Officer, Point Mugu; Lt. Col. J.W. Richards, USAF, from the Air War College; Col. J.W.P. Robertson, USMC, from the Marine Corps Educational and Development Command; and Comdr. W.E. Turcotte, SC, USN, from the Naval Supply Systems Command; have all come to the War College and joined the Management faculty. Lt. Col. E.L. Gallup, USA, Lt. Comdr. M.W. Gavlak, and Comdr. J.M. Webster of last year's graduating classes have joined the Management Department also.

The Management faculty will be:

Prof. W.F. Rogers, Chairman Lt. Col. J.T. Abell, USAF Capt. H.D. Barker, USN Prof. G.F. Brown, Jr.

Comdr. J.L. Carenza, SC, USN
Capt. A.H. Cornell, SC, USN
Lt. Col. E.L. Gallup, USA
Prof. P.L. Gamble
Lt. Comdr. M.W. Gavlak, USN
Comdr. C.P. Hammon, USN
Lt. Col. J. Hogan, USA
Col. L.W. Jackley, USA
Capt. C. Lewis, USN
Prof. R. Lloyd
Comdr. D.J. Moss, USN

Comdr. W.A. Peters, SC, USN Lt. Col. J.W. Richards, USAF Col. J.W.P. Robertson, USMC Prof. C.P. Shirkey Comdr. J.W. Speer, SC, USN Comdr. W.E. Turcotte, SC, USN Comdr. S.G. Underhill, USN Comdr. J.M. Webster, USN Prof. F.J. West, Jr. Capt. J.E. Wilson, Jr., USN Ens. F.F. York, USNR

Tactics Department. Officers who have recently joined the Tactics Department are: Capt. R.H. Barker, formerly Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Intrepid (CVS-11); Capt. R.B. Connelly from Staff, Commander Submarines Atlantic; Capt. T.R. Cotten, Jr., from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Capt. W. Ramsey reporting from command of U.S.S. Pensacola (LSD-38); Capt. H.W. Smevog from command of Carrier Anti-Submarine Group 56; Comdr. J.V. Hall, recently Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Perry (DD-844; plus members of the recent class—Capt. E.M.C. Walker, RN; Lt. Col. K.W. Andrus, USMC; Comdr. L.E. Krekel, USN; and Comdr. Z.L. Newcomb, USN. Professor Shoup has moved from Management to Tactics.

The Tactics faculty will be:

Capt. E.C. Kenyon, USN, Chairman
Capt. W. Abromitis, USN
Lt. Col. K.W. Andrus, USMC
Capt. R.H. Barker, USN
Capt. R.B. Bathurst, USN
Comdr. W.G. Carson, USN
Lt. Col. G.J. Collins, USAF
Capt. R.B. Connelly, USN
Capt. T.R. Cotten, Jr., USN
Comdr. J.R. Devereaux, USN
Comdr. L.T. Furey, USN
Comdr. J.V. Hall, USN
Lt. Col. J.H. Higgins, USMC
Capt. C.C. Hobdy, USCG

Capt. R.L. Huth, USN
Comdr. R.C. Kemper, USN
Comdr. L.E. Krekel, USN
Comdr. D.R. Maher, USN
Comdr. B.D. McKay, USN
Capt. C.K. Moore, USN
Comdr. Z.L. Newcomb, USN
Comdr. C.P. Pfarrer, Jr., USN
Capt. W. Ramsey, USN
Prof. F.E. Shoup III
Capt. H.W. Smevog, USN
Lt. Comdr. H.D. Sturr, USN
Capt. E.M. Walker, RN

FINANCIAL REPORT (Expressed in 000's)

	Fiscal Year 1972	Fiscal Year 1973
AUTHORIZED OPERATING FUNDS:	\$6,549.9	\$6,938.9
OPERATING FUND EXPENDITURES:		
Resident U.S. Courses Professional Salaries Military Salaries Other Civilian Salaries Student Travel Student Texts Staff and Faculty Travel Printing and Reproduction Library Acquisitions Honoraria	\$ 265.0 3,200.8 1,927.5 66.4 15.3 51.5 130.9 89.2 63.1	\$ 316.6 3,489.1 1,996.1 5.8 132.6 53.4 146.8 75.7 62.7
International Colleges	\$ 25.5	\$ 17.9
Other Expenditures Seapower/Maritime Symposium Center for Continuing Education Center for War Gaming Naval War College Review Plant Maintenance Utilities Composite Costs	\$ 149.5 22.5 53.6 60.9 100.8 157.0 169.9	\$ 26.0 43.7 35.5 82.2 189.3 264.2
End of Year Balance	.5 \$6,549.9	1.3 \$6,938.9

Financial Highlights. Funds available to us, with the exception of military personnel funds, have remained relatively constant during the period of this report. Our new academic directions have required budgetary realignments, and the following highlights touch upon a revised financial management orientation.

o The number of professional educators on the faculty of the Naval War College has increased. This change was offset by military personnel costs during fiscal year 1974.

- Professional educational materials have received a far greater degree of financial support. Student field study trips and individual student travel expenses have been virtually eliminated in favor of professional educational material acquisitions.
- o Spruance Hall became operational during fiscal year 1973 and Conolly Hall will become operational during fiscal year 1974. Plant maintenance funds were reduced \$18,600 during fiscal year 1973, and 1974 plant maintenance funds will be less than 1972. Only essential maintenance actions are being completed.

In sum, the Naval War College operates within an environment of major fixed costs. Our financial flexibility after salaries and fixed plant expenses is restricted to less than 20 percent of our operating budget.

LECTURE SERIES

Raymond Spruance Annual Lecture. As the challenge to American seapower expands, so does the need for original and inspired thought on the maintenance of that power by the maritime elements of our society. In an effort to both encourage and distribute such ideas, the Naval War College inaugurated the Spruance Lecture Series last December. Funded by donations to the Naval War College Foundation, this annual address, open to all students, faculty, and staff, consists of the formal presentation of a scholarly paper on maritime power or strategy by a highly respected authority in the field. The lecture given this past year was by Herman Wouk, author of the current bestseller Winds of War. Mr. Wouk's topic was "The Naval Officer in an Age of Revolution" and provided valuable new perspectives on the changing environment faced by the services.

Distinguished Foreign Visitor Lecture Series. Assisted by funds from the Naval War College Foundation, distinguished foreign guest lecturers were invited to the campus. This year's speakers were: Gen. Andre Beaufre of France, who lectured on "Strategy in Our Times," and Vice Adm. J.B.M.J. Maas (Ret.) of the Royal Netherlands Navy, who discussed "Modernization of the Dutch Navy."

Adm. Kazutomi Uchida (Ret.), of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, is scheduled to be our next visitor.

These guests remained at the college for several days following their presentations and participated in seminars and discussion 32

periods with the students. Clearly these lectures and subsequent discussions were a big step in the direction of better understanding and cooperation between free world maritime powers.

LIBRARY

The resources and services of Mahan Library increased in quality and quantity during the past year. The library added 3,575 titles and 4,776 volumes to its collection during the year. At the same time, a vigorous weeding program has been in progress, resulting in a collection in excess of 200,000 volumes and 900 periodicals.

Not included in these figures is the 7,000 volume collection bequeathed to the Naval War College by the late Comdr. Marsden J. Perry, USNR (Ret.) and received by the library in April of this year. The collection comprises titles in military and naval history and strategy, seafaring and shipping history, geopolitics and related subjects, as well as a number of maps, charts, and artifacts.

Inasmuch as the student-required reading increased by over threefold—45 books were provided for the basic courses—the library experienced some reduction in their circulation. Nevertheless, extensive bibliographic and reference services were provided students to assist them in writing research papers and essays required in their course of study and to faculty members to assist them in preparation of the curriculum.

Since the pace of publishing continues unabated and the intellectual horizons of the Naval War College are continually expanding, the library's collections in support of the college programs will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. A training program in library automation and management has been undertaken in preparation for eventual automation of some library functions.

The Naval Historical Collection of the library completed its retrieval of Naval War College Archives from Federal Record Centers around the country with the receipt of 185 cubic feet of records from the center in Waltham, Mass., and by the routine records disposal program of the college. Besides, the Naval Historical Collection prepared five new exhibits in various locations on the campus. Liaison was continued with the Naval War College Foundation in matters of appropriate acquisitions, and several items were procured upon recommendation through its offices.

Staff librarians have been active in state and national library association activities. Mahan Library is a member of the New England Library Information Network and the Consortium of Rhode Island Academic and Research Libraries. Through participation in these activities and organizations, the library maintains strong ties with the wider academic community.

MILITARY-MEDIA SYMPOSIUM

Among the continuing themes in the college's Strategy curriculum has been the place of the Military Establishment in a free society: What is society's view of the Military Establishment? How is that view—or those views—shaped? In what ways do the civilian community's views of the Military Establishment influence how the military carries out its duties?

The question is explored in its historical contexts in such Strategy seminars as those which discussed Lincoln and His Generals and The American Civil War, England vs. Napoleon, and Athenian Democracy at War.

Public views of the military are largely formed by the American media—newspapers, news magazines, radio, and television. More than 50 representatives of both national and regional news media were therefore invited to a 2-day conference last November held at the War College and oriented on the subject *The Military and the Media*. All of the services sent their Public Affairs chiefs, and the keynote address was presented by the Honorable Daniel Hencken, at that time the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Information.

The conference involved formal presentations, seminars, dinners, and more than a few postprandial conversations at the Officers' Club and in local restaurants. The dialog was frank and pointed on both sides. It appeared to facilitate a better understanding of the attitudes and duties of each side. Even though the views of the media representatives and of the student body were not appreciably changed, the exchange did promote improved mutual respect. Cliches and caricatures were abused. The conference will be held again in November 1973.

Some of the attendees from the media side were:

Mr. Seymour Hersh, The New York Times

Mr. Lewis H. Lapham, Military Editor, Harper's Magazine

Mr. Richard J. Levine, Wall Street Journal,

Pentagon Correspondent

Mr. Gordon Manning, Columbia Broadcasting System Professor Charles Burton Marshall, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington

Mr. Charles Black, Columbus (Ga.) Enquirer

Mr. John Cochran, National Broadcasting Company News

Miss Gloria Emerson, The New York Times

Miss Frances FitzGerald, Author

Mr. Sheward Hagerty, New York Daily News

Mr. Abraham H. Kalish, Accuracy in Media

Mr. Ted Koppel, American Broadcasting Company News

Mr. Drew Middleton, The New York Times

Mr. Garth C. Reeves, Sr., Miami Times

Mr. William Styron, Author

Mr. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Reader's Digest

Mr. Sander Vanocur, Public Broadcasting Service

Mr. Richard J. Cattani, The Christian Science Monitor

NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

June of 1973 witnessed the 17th class to graduate from the Naval Command College, representing senior international officers from 32 countries. Malaysia and Nigeria were represented for the first time, and this brought the total to 45 international navies who have at one time or another been represented at the Naval Command College. Besides the two nations mentioned above, the United States was represented by a student in this year's Naval Command College for the first time. As with the Naval Staff Course, this innovation was helpful to the international students in their understanding of U.S. attitudes and added further professional and cultural cross-fertilization for the international officers.

Recognizing that the Naval Command College is the counterpart of the U.S. College of Naval Warfare, it was only appropriate that we consider whether changes made in the U.S. curriculum were applicable to the international course. All navies are beset with problems of economics and resource allocation, therefore it was only common sense that the Naval Command College students be brought into the Management curriculum taught in the Naval Warfare Course during the winter semester. The contribution and performance of the Naval Command College students were both impressive and stimulating to the U.S. students. Also, for the first time the Naval Command College students participated in the Current Strategy Forum. Both international courses wrote back-

ground papers for the forum, and several of these students made formal presentations.

During academic year 1973-74 we will give the Naval Command College students even more exposure to the U.S. curriculum. Their performance in the past year clearly demonstrates that these officers are more than capable of mastering the subject matter. Overall, the schedule for the Naval Command College will preserve its separate identity while at the same time offering these students a more challenging program that reflects the changes taking place here.

NAVAL STAFF COURSE

In view of the long success of the Naval Command College course for senior international officers, a new international program was initiated last September at the command and staff level. This program covers the same areas as the U.S. Naval Command and Staff Course-Strategy, Defense Decisionmaking, and Tactics. The curriculum covers a 24-week period; students are lieutenants and lieutenant commanders from the free world navies; and the course convenes twice each year, in August and in January. The following countries were represented in the first and second Naval Staff Courses:

st (Course	Second	Cou
		~~~~~	0.00

Firs irse Brazil Brazil Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Federal German Navy Federal German Navy

Indonesia

Khmer Republic Khmer Republic Lebanon Lebanon Liberia

Nationalist China Nationalist China

Peru Philippines Philippines Saudi Arabia

Singapore Singapore Spain Thailand Thailand

Turkey

United Kingdom **United States United States** Uruguay Uruguay Vietnam Vietnam

A U.S. student is included in each course, which aids the international officers' understanding of the United States, further substantiates the value of these courses, and stimulates professional cross-fertilization.

The students are offered an introduction to the United States through both lectures and field trips and gain specialized knowledge through courses in International Law, Ocean Resources Development, and Revolutionary Warfare.

#### NAVAL WAR COLLEGE FOUNDATION

The Naval War College Foundation is a self-supporting, non-profit corporation which was organized in November 1969 as a private source of aid to the Naval War College in the fulfillment of its educational mission.

In addition to its 176 Founder Members, the foundation offers Corporate Membership. Forty leading corporations of the United States have accepted invitations to become Corporate Members.

The foundation has supported several projects this year which have contributed to the vitality of the academic program of the Naval War College. One example is the Military-Media Symposium for which the foundation donated \$4,000. The foundation donated \$1,673 for the specific use of the Naval War College in furtherance of the International Lecture Series and \$2,500 for the Admiral Raymond A. Spruance Memorial Lecture Series.

Significant contributions to the foundation in support of the foregoing programs were donated by the Ambrose Monell Foundation, the Harry Freund Memorial Foundation, and Mrs. Lucius P. Ordway.

In addition, the foundation provided financial assistance for an editorial and biographical project on the writings of Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, USN, founder of the Naval War College. This monograph will be published by the Naval War College upon its completion.

In the past year additional memorabilia and naval artifacts have been donated to the foundation, and these items have been placed on deposit in the Mahan Library where they are maintained under the aegis of the Curator of the Naval War College Historical Collection.

#### NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The most significant event that took place in the management of the *Review* this year was adjusting the publishing schedule from 10 issues per year (September-June) to bimonthly. This change was made to increase the quality of the *Review's* content while realizing significant dollar savings. I believe that this objective has been met.

With regard to content of the *Review*, there has been some decline in the number of articles written by War College students in recent years. This year we worked to reverse this trend and were able to increase student contribution to 35 percent, an increase of 20 percent over the previous year. I believe that we can do better, particularly by emphasizing to the students the value of writing their term papers in a form and at a length that will be publishable. In addition, we intend to require students and others who are working in the Advanced Research Program to provide abbreviated versions of their research papers that will be suitable for publication.

During this past year, the Review circulation increased by 6 percent to a total of 14,200. About 1,000 of these can be attributed to a new policy on subscribers. Previously, only officers of the rank of lieutenant commander and senior were invited to subscribe, but in midyear we lowered this to lieutenant on the assumption that it is important to stimulate the thinking of our officers as early as possible, particularly before they come to the War College.

At the same time, we feel that our circulation has "hardened" over the past year. By requiring individual subscribers to verify their continuing need for the journal through resubscription and by continuously culling Navy units and other Government agency listings, we have been able to gain a sound professional following. This has been verified by increased letters to the editor—a program which has improved but one with which I am still not fully satisfied. However, the *Review* does have other forms of feedback that provide a useful index as to the professional value of its content. We have received 78 requests for reprinting *Review* articles in FY 1973, and at least 11 articles have been abstracted by academic and defense related journals this year.

As regards the management aspect of the Review, net printing and distribution costs for FY 1973 were \$33,009, a savings of

38

\$25,691 over FY 1972. The release of these funds provided more money to support the resident student program.

#### **NEW CURRICULUM**

The three basic courses will be interwoven between the College of Naval Warfare (CNW), the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S), and the Naval Command College (NCC) as follows:

	1st Trimester (14 weeks)	2d Trimester (14 weeks)	3d Trimester (10 weeks)
CNW	Strategy and Policy	Defense Decision- making	Naval Tactics
NCC	Strategy and Policy	Defense Decision- making	Naval Tactics
CNC&S	Defense Decision- making	Naval Tactics	Strategy and Policy

This program minimizes faculty requirements by dividing the student load roughly into two equal groups which will be taught by separate faculties each trimester. It also means that each faculty teaches two trimesters out of three and has one trimester for research, teaching electives, and study.

Under this year's program CNW and CNC&S students will take identical Defense Decisionmaking Courses. CNW is offered 4 more weeks of Strategy and Policy than CNC&S, while the reverse will hold true for Naval Tactics. Specific curricula data for each course follows.

## Strategy and Policy

#### **Seminar Topics:**

I. The Classical Prototype: Athens versus Sparta

Required Reading:

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (Books I-VII), R. Warner, trans.

Louis Halle, "A Message from Thucydides," Appendix in Civilization and Foreign Policy

M.I. Finley, "Thucydides' War," Horizon, January 1960

II. Strategic Theory: Clausewitz and Corbett

Required Reading:

Karl von Clausewitz, On War, A. Rapoport, ed.

Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy

Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Introduction and chaps. 1-5

Michael Howard, "The Relevance of Traditional Strategy," Foreign Affairs, January 1973

Bernard Brodie, "On Clausewitz: a Passion for War," World Politics, January 1973

III. The Strategy of Total War: the Napoleonic Era

Required Reading:

Felix M. Markham, Napoleon

Geoffrey Bennett, Nelson the Commander

Stephen W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power

Norman Gibbs and Christopher Lloyd, "Armed Forces and the Art of War," chap. 3 in The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830

Herbert W. Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power

Julian Corbett, "Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar," Quarterly Review (London), April 1922

IV. Balance of Power Diplomacy: Prince Metternich

Required Reading:

Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power

Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored

Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna

V. The Strategy of Limited War: Otto von Bismarck

Required Reading:

Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War

A.J.P. Taylor, Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman

Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, chap. 8

Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, chaps. 4 and 5

## VI. Militarism, Navalism, and the Coming of World War I Required Reading:

Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914

Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Vol. I: The Road to War, 1904-1914

Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, chaps. 8 and 17

Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, chaps. 6 and 7

Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Introductory and chap. 1

#### VII. The Strategic Lessons of World War I

### Required Reading:

Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War

Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918

Edward M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, chaps. 12 and 13

## VIII. Naval Disarmament Between the Wars: the Washington Treaties

#### Required Reading:

Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power

Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922

Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy

U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament

41

U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament: Subcommittees

Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, v. II, V, VI

Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare, 3d ed.

## IX. The Strategy of Coalition War: World War ${\mathbb I}$

#### Required Reading:

Kent R. Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II: a Reconsideration

William H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946

Stephen W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power

### X. Containment and the Cold War

#### Required Reading:

John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947

Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson

William H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946

#### **XI.** The Military Profession

### Required Reading:

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier

Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines and Modern Times

C.S. Forester, The General

### XII. Strategy and Policy: Current Problems

### Required Reading:

Bernard Brodie, War and Politics


Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society

The principal changes in topics from last year are the deletion of the "Civil War" and the "Spanish-American War" and the

substitution of seminars on Metternich and on Naval Disarmament. Additionally, the course has been lengthened from 13 to 14 weeks, and the period assigned to the term paper has been reduced from 4 to 2 weeks. This permitted adding topics on the Cold War. One of these weeks will be in the middle of the term with one at the end, and the student will be expected to work on his term paper concurrently with his seminar activities.

#### Defense Economics and Decisionmaking

This course addresses the problems associated with allocating limited national resources to defense programs in a manner consistent with national goals and strategy. The purpose of the study is to develop understanding of the objectives and missions of the Navy in the context of the broad military strategy of which they are a part, and an appreciation for the process of rational choice among alternative ways of accomplishing them. The course is organized as portrayed in the figure below:



The first 9 weeks is concerned with the tools for decision-making. It is subdivided into three segments which will be given concurrently. Two of these subcourses titled "Analytic Methods" and "Decisionmaking in Organizations" are structured as formal classroom lecture series. The third, titled "Analysis of Defense Decisions" will be conducted in seminar with primary emphasis on case studies.

The subcourse in Analytic Methods will address those quantitative methods which have proven useful in structuring complex decisions. The primary emphasis will be on the logic of such procedures rather than on developing facility in their use.

The Decisionmaking in Organization subcourse is concerned with the human and organizational influences on decisionmaking and the constraints such factors can and do impose. It is designed to complement the quantitative course.

The Analysis of Defense Decisions subcourse is a series of case studies. The case studies are designed in part to illustrate the principles of analytic thought which will be presented in the course and to develop an appreciation for the judgmental factors which must ultimately determine decisions of great significance.

The course on Budgets and Constraints deals with the competing factors involved in putting together the national budget and the Department of Defense budget. Finally, the Decision Implementation Course looks at the role of Congress, of industry, and of public opinion on our ability to carry out decisions and on how the decisions themselves are made.

The principal texts used in the overall course are:

Bierman, Bonini and Hausman, Quantitative Analysis for Business Decisions

A.C. Enthoven and K.W. Smith, How Much Is Enough?

Gore and Dyson, The Making of Decisions

R.G. Head and E.J. Rokke, American Defense Policy

C.J. Hitch and R.N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age

Kolb, Rubin, and McIntyre, Organizational Psychology

Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation

Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines and Modern Times

E.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning

H. Raiffa, Decision Analysis

Rourke Bureaucracy Politics and Public Policy

Simon, Administrative Behavior

Terry, For Whites Only

**Naval Tactics** 

This course is designed to acquaint the students with those factors (technical, operational, environmental, legal, and political) which affect the considerations, alternatives, and trade-offs which a tactical commander must keep in mind. The course should improve each officer's ability to make judgments based upon an analysis of all relevant factors involved in any given tactical situation.

The course is divided into the following seven studies:

- 1. Military Planning Process
- 2. Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems
- 3. Engagement Analyses
- 4. Sea Control
- 5. Projection
- 6. Presence
- 7. Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

The Military Planning Process study will focus primarily on the methods of analysis that can best be used on the tactical level. Concepts of operations, tactical decisionmaking, analytical techniques, systems analysis and operational planning, joint operations, and the military staff will be taught.

The Fundamentals of Naval Weapons Systems study will cover sensors, weapons, and platforms to provide a common level of understanding of those factors and physical limits which govern capabilities of naval weapons systems and how these factors have tactical significance.

Engagement Analyses are entered into to relate fundamental principles to typical platforms and weapons systems at the lowest level of encounter. This provides a mechanism for examining critical points in an encounter and the tactical options available at these points.

The Sea Control study analyzes the factors involved in commanding a task force operation including: operational decisionmaking in the sortie, rendezvous, and transit; midocean distant support by VP, SOSUS, and SSN; tactical employment of a carrier group; and tactical considerations in defense of a task force against airborne attack.

The Projection study deals with alternative concepts for the tactical employment of naval forces assigned to projection

missions. Included within the scope of the projection study are: analytical models for interdiction, combat air support, air superiority, amphibious operations, joint operations, and the role of carriers in projection missions.

In the Naval Presence study the facets of the nonbelligerent use of military force in support of political objectives are examined. Alternative means of achieving the goals of naval presence with limited resources as well as legal restriction involved are considered.

As the final phase of Naval Tactics, the Nuclear Deterrence study is concerned with the principles and concepts of nuclear deterrence as they are understood today, including: deterrent survivability, counterforce structure, first strike weaponry and strategies, the effect of ABM's, and mutual deterrence. In particular, the Navy's role as embodied in sea-based deterrent forces is considered.

#### RESERVE COURSES

With a firm belief that the "One Navy" concept applies as much to the field of professional education as elsewhere, the War College provides considerable support to the Naval Reserve. In return, we receive valuable feedback and stimulation from a source often overlooked. Besides the correspondence support offered Reserve officers, three separate programs are conducted for Naval Reservists on 2-weeks active duty for training.

Senior Reserve Officer Course: This course has involved about 125 students of the grade of captain and commander each year for the past 23 years. Scheduled toward the end of the War College academic year, the second week of this course has traditionally involved joint participation in the Global Strategy Discussions, now called Current Strategy Forum.

With only 1 week allotted to their academic pursuits, it became necessary to compress this side of their program to a mere survey of what the regular students receive. Additional ground was covered by presenting these senior Reserve officers with substantial reading requirements and the requirement for the preparation of papers prior to their reporting. In essence, they covered an overview of each section of the curriculum and probed one topic in depth.

Nevertheless, while the response of the Reserve officers was

uniformly enthusiastic, the greatest shortcoming was the limitation of time that could be spent with each academic department. Thus we have elected to move the dates of the Senior Reserve Officer Course for 1974 to convene prior to the Current Strategy Forum. This will enable next year's Reserve class to spend twice as much time in dealing with the resident curriculum. Hopefully, this approach will stimulate some of these officers to take the full War College course through correspondence.

Reserve Officer Command and Staff Course. Each spring for the past 20 years the War College has offered this course to about 60 Reserve officers of the grade of lieutenant commander and below. Although taught this year much as in previous years, the success of the new Senior Reserve Officer Course has led to modeling next year's course after the resident Command and Staff Course.

Reserve War Gaming Course. Since October 1969 the War College has provided periodic war gaming courses to Naval Reserve officers ranging from the grade of lieutenant to that of captain. This year eight 2-week courses were conducted with a total of 372 students. These students were primarily Naval Reservists serving in surface divisions. The course was designed to assist these officers in developing scenarios, operations orders, and battle problem procedures for operational readiness type training exercises at their surface divisions. The program contributes not only to the expertise of attending reservists, but to the officers and enlisted men in their parent units.

As a quality control follow-up of this program, members of the War College's war gaming faculty visited 30 Naval Reserve Centers last year to observe battle problems in action and to provide advice.

#### SENIOR OFFICER MANAGEMENT COURSE

The sixth Annual Senior Officer Management Course, in which 30 flag and general officers participated, was conducted from 9 to 20 July. The course was developed jointly by the Naval War College and the MIT Sloan School of Management and is taught primarily by professors from the Sloan School. The curriculum covers the behavioral sciences, managerial planning and control, fundamental economics, systems analysis, and planning, programing, and budgeting. It offers insight into the latest thinking by

academia and business in the general field of management. Especially tailored for officers with flag rank responsibilities, it is by no means a "how to do it" refresher on defense procedures. Instead, it provides understanding of ideas in and outside the defense environment which, hopefully, will stimulate more innovative thinking on the part of our flag officer managers.

Any flag officer has difficulty finding 2 weeks to take off from his regular duties. To help accommodate this, we shortened the course slightly this year by having it begin on a Monday noon, thus enabling officers from the east coast to remain at home until that morning. The course was terminated on noon of the second Friday to facilitate an early return home. Despite the initial reservations about taking this time off, the officers who participated evaluated the program as well worth the time and effort. A majority of the officers attending are selectees of the last year or two, but a number of senior rear admirals have attended. The following officers attended the July 1973 class:

Rear Adm. Herbert S. Ainsworth, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. William H. Ellis, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Stanley Fine, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. William H. Harris, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Kenneth G. Haynes, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Justin E. Langille III, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Robert P. McKenzie, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. William H. McLaughlin, Jr., U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Gordon R. Nagler, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Reuben G. Rogerson, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Richard E. Rumble, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Robert F. Schoultz, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Alfred J. Whittle, Jr., U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Charles S. Williams, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Thomas J. Allshouse, SC, U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Cyril T. Faulders, Jr., U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. R.K. Geiger, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Paul Kaufman, MC, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Randolph W. King, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. George D. Selfridge, DC, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. John C. Shepard, SC, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Carlton B. Smith, SC, U.S. Navy

Rear Adm. Robert G. Williams, Jr., MC, U.S. Navy

Brig. Gen. Nolan J. Beat, U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. George R. Brier, U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Noah C. New, U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Thurman Owens, U.S. Marine Corps Rear Adm. John B. Hayes, U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Julian E. Johansen, U.S. Coast Guard

### STUDENT BODY COMPOSITION (1972-73)

College of Naval Warfare		College of Naval Command and Staff		
U.S. Army	27	U.S. Army	36	
U.S. Air Force	16	U.S. Air Force	14	
U.S. Marine Corps	30	U.S. Marine Corps	20	
U.S. Coast Guard	1	U.S. Coast Guard	6	
Civilian  Central Intelligence Agency Department of State Air Systems Command National Security Agency U.S. Information Agency Department of Commerce Defense Communications Agency Defense Supply Agency Department of the Army civilian Defense Intelligence Agency Naval Air Development Center Naval Weapons Center Naval Ship Research and Development Center Naval Missile Center	(1) (1) (1) (1)	U.S. Navy Surface Aviator Flight Officer Supply Submarine Other Cryptology Intelligence Engineering Public Affairs Judge Advocate Civil Engineer  x x x x x  Average Age CNW CNC&S	(74) (40) (12) (13) ( 5) ( 8) (2) (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	
U.S. Navy  Aviator Surface Supply Submarine Other  Cryptology (2) Intelligence (2) Judge Advocate (2) Women Line (2) Engineering (1) Public Affairs (1) Geophysics (1) Chaplain (1) Civil Engineer (1)	93 (39) (30) ( 8) ( 3) (13)	CNC&S  CNW CNC&S  Graduate Record Examination CNW: Verbal Quantitative  CNC&S: Verbal Quantitative	64 47	

#### STUDENT FEEDBACK

The formal feedback procedures at the Naval War College consist of End-of-Course Questionnaires, President's Hours, and End-of-Year Evaluations. The End-of-Course Questionnaires are aimed at an evaluation of specific courses of study completed by the student. President's Hours occurred at various times throughout the academic year in which the President fielded questions from students at meetings with each of the resident schools and members of the appropriate academic faculty. Toward the end of the last academic year, the President circulated an End-of-Year Evaluation to the students. In his covering memo he restated the educational goals of the War College and requested student comments on any aspect of War College activity, but also delineated specific topics in which the President was particularly interested. These specific areas included workload, continuity, teaching methodology, examinations, decisionmaking capabilities, electives, postgraduate education, high/low point of the year, and attitude. Replies from the students were on an optional basis.

A summary of student responses as garnered from End-of-Course Questionnaires and President's Hours is reflected in the basic text of this article. Response to the End-of-Year Evaluations has been limited thus far with only 16 percent of the student body returning the questionnaires.

Student comment was frank and well articulated. Naturally, much student comment addressed itself to specific areas of individual concern. Student comments and criticism coincided to a high degree with the problems as perceived by the Naval War College staff and faculty.

The workload was heavy at first for most students. As their academic skills returned to them, however, the challenges of study became less demanding; consequently, students found they had more time available during the second and third trimesters.

Continuity between the three core courses was apparent to some and obscure to others. Teaching methodology was praised by some and criticized by others, with individual faculty abilities accounting in part for this disparity. Intensive efforts have been made to ensure that resident faculty members are knowledgeable, current in their field, and well versed in the latest teaching techniques.

A large number of students supported the concept of examinations. Criticism of the examination system centered more on the 50

methodology by which they were presented and evaluated. Feedback of examination results to the student was another issue. Procedures varied somewhat from one course to another and this made some students uneasy about the examination system. As a result of this criticism, steps have been taken to ensure a higher degree of standardization for the examination system among the academic departments and meaningful and rapid feedback to the student.

The elimination of the postgraduate education program from the senior course was controversial, with more students opposing the action than favoring it. Whereas it was available to the College of Naval Command and Staff students on an optional basis, students of the College of Naval Warfare were not permitted to enroll in the George Washington University electives program.

The student feedback has substantiated our belief that the War College has succeeded in its mission to cultivate the student's mental facility for dealing with broader issues of strategic thinking, military professionalism, and sound decisionmaking.

#### WAR GAMING

Our Naval War College War Gaming Facility provides three kinds of gaming support:

Student Instruction. The existing analog gaming facility, known as Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS), is equipped more for strategic gaming of the operations orders of major commanders than for tactical interaction in gaming. A great number of students is needed to develop operations orders and to fulfill subordinate roles in the game play. Relatively few students participate as the admirals or decisionmakers. To reflect the emphasis on decisionmaking in the new curriculum, special student-player decision games were developed this year. Most of these games were played manually, though some used the NEWS as well. The students were divided into staffs of four to five officers, and the position of commander rotated between the members. Hence, each officer was placed in a position which required decisions under the twin stresses of time and uncertainty that one is generally confronted with in a tactical situation. In fact, these war games were reminiscent of the "quick-decision" games played here in the 1930's.

Fleet Support Gaming. The NEWS facility provides an excellent opportunity for fleet commanders and other commands to test their operations plans or new operational concepts down at least to the level of unit tactical interactions. The following games were played this year:

 SEACON-72, sponsored by the Chief of Naval Material. The first NEWS war game to include civilian analysts and scientists working together in a conflict situation.

oSEALOG II, sponsored by Joint Navy-Marine Corps Seaborne Mobile Logistics System Study. This game generated logistics requirements.

- MODERN PARADE II, sponsored by SACLANT. Second in the series of war games established by SACLANT to provide supporting data and information for biennial Force Proposals.
- o SEACON-73, sponsored by the Chief of Naval Material. Similar to SEACON-72, SEACON-73 employed greater numbers of forces and a more detailed play of advanced weapons and sensor systems.
- VALIDATION GAME, sponsored by the War College and Op-96 with CNA support. A submarine game to determine if war gaming can provide insight into human command decisionmaking under stress and uncertainty.

Inter-American War Gaming. Last October saw the play of the first Inter-American War Game. The game itself was developed jointly by naval officers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, the United States, and Venezuela. Although umpired here at Newport by a multinational group, the game was played remotely at the War Colleges of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. This remote play provided the first opportunity to test the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network. Both that test and the game itself were most successful and represent a valuable step in the continuing development of inter-American naval cooperation.

Future. Looking to the future of instructional gaming, we are presently seeking to determine how our forthcoming phased digital gaming facility, Warfare Analysis and Research Systems (WARS), can best be tailored to instructional purposes, especially individual decisionmaking. WARS' hardware and software are moving along nicely and should be adaptable to the type of instructional purpose we have in mind.

#### WIVES' COURSES

Wives of military officers traditionally provide a bastion of support and strength for their husbands' careers, but often have little opportunity for direct exposure to his profession. To acquaint our students' wives with their husbands' curricula, evening courses in Management and Strategy were offered. These courses, roughly paralleled those of the resident curriculum. They developed a significant following among distaff members of the War College community. Approximately 110 wives attended the history-oriented strategy program, perhaps gaining new insights into the importance of seapower and its relationship to their husbands' profession. Attendance during the management phase of study was about 50. Two other courses were also offered, strictly for the personal edification of those participating. These were: "The Evolving Third World," 10 weeks in duration with 150 attendees, and "East Asia and the World," also 10 weeks and with some 200 participants. The East Asia course was open not only to wives but to the resident student population and other interested base personnel.

Ψ

